DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 132 101 SO 009 639

AUTHOR	Parrish, Michael E.; And Others
TITLE	American Issues Forum, Volume II: The Molding of American Values. A Study Guide for Courses by Newspaper.
INSTITUTION	California Univ., San Diego. Univ. Extension.
SPONS AGENCY	American Revolution Bicentennial Administration, Washington, D.C.; National Endowment for the Humanities (NFAH), Washington, D.C.
PUB DATE	76
NOTE	91p.; For related documents, see SO 009 637-638
AVAILABLE FROM	Publisher's Inc., 243 12th Street, Drawer P, Del Mar, California 92014 ($2.95)
EDRS PRICE	MF-$0.83 Plus Postage. HC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS	Adult Education; American Culture; American Government (Course); *American Studies; Annotated Bibliographies; Citizen Participation; *Citizenship; Course Content; Democratic Values; Discussion Experience; Economics; Fundamental Concepts; Instructional Materials; International Relations; Labor Force; Nationalism; *Newspapers; Political Science; Secondary Education; Social Environment; Social Studies; Social Values; Study Guides; Teaching Techniques; *United States History; *Values
IDENTIFIERS	American Issues Forum; *Bicentennial

ABSTRACT

The study guide is designed to be used with other instructional materials in a one-semester curriculum program which is linked to topics outlined in the American Issues Forum calendar. It is intended for use at the local level. This course seeks to develop new understandings of the problems and realities of contemporary America. Ways in which American values and assumptions about national character can be tested by a people's activities are explored. It examines phases of America at work and at leisure, the nation's self-conceived role in the international scene, and the social institutions which have directed and shaped American character. Four units which correspond to units in the reader and newspaper articles, comprise the study guide. They are Working in America; The Business of America; America in the World; and Growing up and Pursuing Happiness in America. Each unit includes key concepts to consider, discussions of the newspaper articles and readings in the reader, study questions for the readings, and an annotated bibliography for each of the units. (Author/ND)

Documents acquired by ERIC include many informal unpublished materials not available from other sources. ERIC makes every effort to obtain the best copy available. Nevertheless, items of marginal reproducibility are often encountered and this affects the quality of the microfiche and hardcopy reproductions ERIC makes available via the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). EDRS is not responsible for the quality of the original document. Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original.

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL BY MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Dr. George Colburn
TO ERIC AND ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING UNDER AGREEMENTS WITH THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION. FURTHER REPRODUCTION OUTSIDE THE ERIC SYSTEM REQUIRES PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNER."

AMERICAN ISSUES FORUM

STUDY GUIDE

SØ 009 639
ED132101

VOLUME TWO

2

AMERICAN ISSUES FORUM

A STUDY GUIDE FOR COURSES BY NEWSPAPER

VOLUME TWO

Publisher's Inc.
Del Mar, California

CONTRIBUTORS

NEIL HARRIS
Professor of History and Director, National Humanities Institute, The University of Chicago

HELEN S. HAWKINS
Post-graduate historian in the Program in Science, Technology and Public Affairs, University of California, San Diego

ROBERT L. HEILBRONER
Norman Thomas Professor of Economics, The Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research

WALTER LaFEBER
Marie Underhill Noll Professor of American History, Cornell University

MICHAEL E. PARRISH
Associate Professor of History, University of California, San Diego

PAUL A. SAMUELSON
Institute Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

JANE L. SCHEIBER
Editorial Director, Courses by Newspaper, University of California, San Diego

AMERICAN ISSUES FORUM:

A STUDY GUIDE FOR COURSES BY NEWSPAPER VOLUME TWO

Michael E. Parrish
with
Helen S. Hawkins
and
Jane L. Scheiber

COURSES BY NEWSPAPER
is a project of
UNIVERSITY EXTENSION
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO
Funded by
THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES

ACADEMIC COORDINATOR

Daniel Aaron, Victor Thomas Professor of English and American Language and Literature, Harvard University

ASSISTANT COORDINATORS

Michael E. Parrish, Associate Professor of History, University of California, San Diego

Allen Weinstein, Professor of History and Director, American Studies Program, Smith College

FACULTY COMMITTEE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Paul D. Saltman, Chairman; Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs and Professor of Biology

Robert C. Elliott, Professor of English Literature

Donald A. Norman, Professor of Psychology

Jacqueline P. Wiseman, Professor of Sociology

Herbert F. York, Professor of Physics

PROJECT DIRECTOR

George A. Colburn, UCSD

EDITORIAL DIRECTOR

Jane L. Scheiber, UCSD

PROJECT CONSULTANT

Caleb A. Lewis, Director of Media Programs, University Extension, UCSD

Copyright © 1976 by The Regents of The University of California.
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 75-18571.
Standard Book Number 89163-011-2

CONTENTS vi

INTRODUCTION viii
COURSE OUTLINE
UNIT ONE: 1
WORKING IN AMERICA
Key Concepts
Articles and Readings
Study Questions
Bibliography
UNIT TWO: 21
"THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA . . . "
Key Concepts
Articles and Readings
Study Questions
Bibliography
UNIT THREE: 39
AMERICA IN THE WORLD
Key Concepts
Articles and Readings
Study Questions
Bibliography
UNIT FOUR: 59
GROWING UP AND PURSUING
HAPPINESS IN AMERICA
Key Concepts
Articles and Readings
Study Questions
Bibliography
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 82



INTRODUCTION

This Study Guide has been prepared to assist both the general reader and students enrolled for credit in the Course by Newspaper entitled, "American Issues Forum II: The Molding of American Values." The Study Guide is organized in four units, each corresponding to one of the four major themes discussed in the newspaper "lectures" or articles by our course authors: Robert L. Heilbroner, Paul A. Samuelson, Walter LaFeber, and Neil Harris. Their sixteen newspaper articles, in turn, have been supplemented by the materials in the Courses by Newspaper Reader, also arranged in four units.

The entire course has been designed as part of the American Issues Forum, a national program for the Bicentennial. A course outline appears on p. viii.

It is our hope that the Study Guide will facilitate your understanding of the many historical events, concepts, and problems raised in the newspaper articles and the Reader. Each section of the Guide begins with a list of "key concepts." They should help focus your attention upon the most important themes presented in the articles and readings.

A short essay follows the "key concepts." In this essay, we have tried to highlight and to summarize the relationships between the newspaper articles and the readings; to suggest, for instance, how a particular idea or problem raised in an article has been explored more fully or modified by selections in the Reader.

We have also included in each section a few "study questions" to stimulate further thought about the topics, to help you gauge your understanding of the materials, and to aid credit enrollees in preparing for examinations. Finally, each unit contains a brief bibliography of additional books or articles, suggested by Heilbroner, Samuelson, LaFeber, and Harris, in the event you wish to investigate their subjects in greater depth.

Although each student will discover for himself or herself how best to use the course materials, we would suggest the following approach:

1. Read the newspaper article each week; clip it and carefully save it for future study and review.
2. Glance over the Key Concepts and the essay in the corresponding unit of the Study Guide. These will call attention to some of the more important points in the lectures and readings, and will help you to read more critically and with a better understanding.
3. Read the appropriate selections in the Reader.
4. Reread the Key Concepts and the essay, more thoroughly this time, considering the issues raised. (You may wish to reread the articles as well.)
5. Proceed to the Study Questions. Suggested guidelines to answers are provided with each question, although there is, of course, no single "correct answer."
6. Turn to the annotated bibliographies for suggestions of further reading on topics of interest.

Throughout the Study Guide we have sought to avoid definitive conclusions and dogmatic interpretations. In fact, we have endeavored to stimulate more questions than we have answered. The measure of good teaching after all, whether by newspaper or otherwise, is the extent to which each student continues to think independently once the teaching per se has been concluded.

We gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Endowment for the Humanities, which provided the funding for this project. The views presented in this Study Guide are those of the authors only, however, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Endowment or of the University of California.

COURSE OUTLINE FOR THE FOURTH COURSE BY NEWSPAPER

AMERICAN ISSUES FORUM II: THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN VALUES

The Molding of American Values concentrates on the ways in which American values and assumptions about national character can be tested by a people's activities. It examines phases of America at work and at leisure, the nation's self-conceived role in the international scene, and the social institutions that have directed and shaped American character. This course seeks to develop new understandings of the problems and realities of contemporary America.

INTRODUCTION

Ailen Weinstein, Professor of History and Director, American Studies Program, Smith College

1. The Revolution Enshrined

Unit I *WORKING IN AMERICA*

Robert L. Heilbroner, Norman Thomas Professor of Economics, The Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research

2. The Changing Face of Labor
3. The Changing Labor Force
4. The Work Ethic
5. Beyond Work: Problems for the Future

Unit II *"THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA . . .": BUYING AND SELLING*

Paul A. Samuelson, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

6. Private Enterprise as an American Way of Life
7. The American Mixed Economy
8. Advertising and the Shaping of American Beliefs
9. Limits to Growth: What Lies Ahead?

Unit III *AMERICA IN THE WORLD*

Walter LaFeber, Noll Professor of History, Cornell University

10. "We Shall Run the World's Business": Americans as Isolationists
11. Insecurity: An American Tradition
12. Americans as Anti-Revolutionaries
13. Presidents, Foreign Policy, and the Only Law of History

Unit IV *GROWING UP AND PURSUING HAPPINESS IN AMERICA: THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN CHARACTER AND VALUES*

Neil Harris, Professor of History, The University of Chicago

14. The Private Matrix: Family and Church
15. Socializing Americans: School and Community
16. Popular Culture as a Reflection of American Character
17. The Rugged Individualist: The Survival of Individualism in a Mass Society

CONCLUSION

Daniel Aaron, Victor Thomas Professor of English and American Language and Literature, and *Allen Weinstein*

18. American Values: Permanence and Change

UNIT ONE:
WORKING IN AMERICA

KEY CONCEPTS

In preindustrial societies nature rather than technology regulates the pace and character of life. Most workers make a living either in agriculture or in the extraction of raw materials. Human muscle power and draft animals, along with wind and water power, represent the basic forms of energy; the production of goods is carried on primarily in the home. Productivity remains low in terms of output per labor hour; the material standard of living is generally beneath today's standards of physical comfort.

Industrial societies are goods-producing societies; power-driven machines dominate life. The major occupation is factory work, organized to mass-produce material goods for distribution in a complex, highly specialized, and coordinated society. The factory replaces the home as the primary center of productive activity, and the relation between worker, manager, and owner becomes highly impersonalized.

Post-industrial societies are primarily based on the provision of services rather than the production of goods. Most work involves interaction between individuals rather than between the individual and the machine. As Daniel Bell observes, the mark of a post-industrial society is the quality of life rather than the quantity of goods produced. At its full development, professional and technical people dominate the post-industrial society, particularly in such fields as education, health, and government.

Labor productivity is the ratio between the output of goods or services and the hours of labor required to produce them. More simply put, it is the index of output per worker hour. Worker productivity depends not only on the work habits of employees but on the amount of labor saving machinery used. American labor productivity increased when machines displaced workers and working hours were shortened; recently it has failed to keep pace with that of other industrial countries.

The labor underclass is Heilbroner's term for those groups willing to perform tasks rejected by other workers or those groups willing to labor at certain jobs for less pay. These workers constitute a "soft" element in the labor market. They keep wages down and enable employers to perpetuate undesirable working conditions. In America, indentured servants, slaves, racial minorities, immigrants, women, and children formed this class.

The work ethic. An ethic is a moral principle of right or wrong conduct. Because Americans often felt a strong psychological compulsion to work hard that was partly based on religious belief, we call those attitudes our "work ethic." The term derives more particularly, however, from the

Protestant ethic of seventeenth-century Puritanism, which strongly influenced American work attitudes. The Protestant ethic amplified on the Christian concept that "to work is to pray" and adapted the disciplined self-denial of medieval monastic life to the everyday world of the individual. Dedication to hard work, frugality, sobriety, and efficiency in one's everyday calling became signs of eternal salvation.

Other factors contributed to the American work ethic. Inasmuch as social status in America did not depend on birth but on financial success, upward social mobility could be achieved through hard work and thrift. Failure to rise in a land of open opportunity might then be blamed on lack of effort.

Blue-collar workers include craftsmen, semi-skilled operatives, and laborers. **White-collar workers** are those in managerial, professional, technical, clerical, or sales work. Another distinction is that between *production* and *service workers*. Workers in the service sector do not produce tangible goods, but instead they provide services to others in transportation, education, health care, marketing, repairs, or commercial operations.

Job satisfaction. A worker's satisfaction depends on a combination of tangible and intangible factors. Among the tangible factors are the wage rate, hours of labor, working conditions, and "fringe benefits" such as vacations, insurance plans, and retirement programs. Intangible factors include a sense of achievement, personal recognition, and status perceptions in relation to other employees and to workers in other occupations. Heilbroner suggests that a new *philosophy of "entitlement"* has made workers expect more rights and benefits on the job as well as meaningful work. A major factor in present day worker dissatisfaction or alienation is not only the boredom and lack of creativity in many jobs, but it is also the sense of having no participation in the decision-making processes of the enterprise.

ARTICLES AND READINGS

Michael E. Parrish

The relationship between work and social values in American life, a central focus of Heilbroner's articles, also preoccupied one of our nation's founders, Thomas Jefferson. The kind of work Americans did, he believed, would influence the quality of their relationships with each other and ultimately determine the nature of their political habits and society.

Initially, Jefferson—himself a farmer, scientist, politician, diplomat, and philosopher—expressed a strong preference for "those who labor in the earth." The moral health of American society, he wrote in *Notes on Virginia*, would depend upon the perpetuation of a self-sufficient agricultural population. "Corruption of morals in the mass of cultivators is a phenomenon of which no age nor nation has furnished an example. It is the mark set on those who, not looking up to heaven, to their own soil and industry, as does the husbandman, for their subsistence, depend for it on casualties and caprice of customers."

Only the self-reliant husbandman, master of his own work and necessities, Jefferson suggested, would avoid economic dependence upon others and therefore be capable of exercising an independent judgment on political affairs. "While we have land to labor," he wrote, "let us never wish to see our citizens occupied at a work-bench or twirling a distaff. When we get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe," he warned James Madison, "we shall become corrupt as in Europe, and go to eating one another as they do there."

The Changing Face of Labor

As Heilbroner's first article and our Reader selections make clear, the nature of work in America has changed dramatically from the late eighteenth century when Jefferson expressed those views to Madison. And no work experience underwent a more profound transformation than agriculture itself.

Farmers today constitute only about 4 percent of the work force; those who still "labor in the earth" bear little resemblance to the self-sufficient husbandman praised by Jefferson and described by Percy Bidwell and John Falconer. Eager to produce cash crops for domestic and foreign markets, American farmers rejected very early the Jeffersonian model of self-sufficiency. Instead, they favored a commercial agriculture that brought them into complex economic relationships with exporters, creditors, and those who controlled transportation by land, water, and rail.

A market-centered agriculture not only made farmers dependent upon others but also encouraged the development of ever larger, impersonal units of production that by the end of the nineteenth century resembled industrial factories in their techniques of specialization. "The Man with

the Hoe," sympathetically portrayed by the poet Edwin Markham, had in fact become the farmer with tractor, seed planter, and harvester, who raised a single cash crop and bought his necessities from Sears, Roebuck and Company.

The contemporary farmer, interviewed by Studs Terkel, shows that farming has become "more a business." He works half of his land as a sharecropper for absentee owners—a doctor, a bricklayer, a contractor's widow, and an aeronautical engineer. He depends upon chemical corporations to fight bugs and weeds; airplanes have become all but indispensable to his production. His own son, moreover, may not continue to work the soil because "he's in management training. He realized he could make more money in some other position than he can farming."

Factory production—the second formative work experience discussed by Heilbroner—removed Americans from contact with the soil, increased their economic dependence upon one another, and improved their material condition. Jefferson, along with many others at the time, accepted this new work experience reluctantly. Those who resisted manufacturing, he wrote in 1816, "must be for reducing us either to dependence on . . . foreign nation[s], or to be clothed in skins, and to live like wild beasts in dens and caverns. I am not one of these; experience has taught me that manufacturers are now necessary to our independence as to our comfort."

From the perspective of young women who first entered the new cotton mills in the 1830s, factory life was often regarded as a form of emancipation from dull household duties and domestic service. "Country girls were naturally independent," Lucy Larcom, a former mill-worker, wrote, "and the feeling that at this new work the few hours they had of every-day leisure were entirely their own was a satisfaction to them. They preferred it to going out as 'hired help.' It was like a young man's pleasure in entering upon business for himself. Girls had never tried that experiment before, and they liked it." Heilbroner also quotes Charles Dickens' positive response to the conditions that he saw in the 1840s—a time when the New England mills still resembled boarding schools.

Larcom and many of her co-workers did not see themselves as a permanent wage-labor force of "factory girls," bound forever to the discipline of power looms. A scheme of classifying workers, inherent in a regime of labor specialization, seemed to her dehumanizing because it "prevents one from making real distinctions, from knowing persons as persons." Nevertheless, a permanent wage-labor force, composed initially of women and later of foreign immigrants, took hold in the mills before the Civil War. Moreover, a series of strikes by women operatives over wage cuts and working conditions in the 1830s and 1840s shattered forever the industrial paradise of Lowell. These conflicts brought to the surface employee-employer antagonisms latent in the new work setting.

Not even Jefferson, accustomed to the brutalizing aspects of master-servant relationships in the slave South, could have anticipated the next

stages of industrial labor in America, characterized by steel mills and assembly lines. Partly as a consequence of these changes in the organization of work, America achieved economic supremacy in the world; the standard of material comfort rose generally throughout the society. Work, however, became more dehumanized as the physical and mental strains of production routines grew in response to the demands for scientific management and efficiency.

The novelist Hamlin Garland, notes Heilbroner, referred to the Homestead steel plant as "the mouth of hell." In a one month period, Leon Wolff reports in his Reader article, sixty-five accidents occurred, seven of which were fatal. In the days before workman's compensation laws, these burdens of the industrial work place fell entirely upon the employees. And, although the general standard of living rose in the post-Civil War years, as the historian Edward Kirkland notes, the benefits of industrialization were not evenly distributed.

The assembly line technique used for meat-packing and later automobiles required less physical trauma for industrial workers, but as Heilbroner points out, this form of work took "the ability—or was it the resignation—to perform identical tasks again and again and again." Enormous changes, of course, have taken place in assembly line production since Henry Ford's early experiments in the 1920s. Innovations by management reduced somewhat the most arduous physical labor. In addition, a powerful union movement swept over the auto industry during the 1930s and brought in its wake a greater voice for employees within the plants.

As reporter William Serrin writes, notable strides have been made in shop conditions, especially since the 1930s: "Plants are cleaner; toilets now have doors; there are more fans for ventilation . . . Automation has eliminated many difficult, backbreaking tasks." So, too, Serrin notes, has the standard of living risen for assembly line workers in the auto industry. "I've worked in the plant since 1929," a GM employee told him, "then we were just a bunch of blue-collar workers who didn't amount to a hill of beans. . . . Now, well, look a lot of us can afford summer cottages, some of us can afford boats, two cars, things like that."

Serrin wrote about the auto workers before the present economic recession shattered many dreams of unending prosperity and affluence. In the past few years, auto workers have fallen upon hard times along with other mass-production employees; despite union, company, and state benefits, thousands of them have been left jobless, barely able to maintain their homes, to say nothing of summer cottages, boats, and two cars. Moreover, as Serrin's study makes clear, even higher wages could not soften the psychological blows suffered by workers who function on "the line, the goddamn line." High rates of absenteeism, physical assaults, sabotage, alcoholism, and drug addiction—all present before the current recession—suggest that even the most efficient assembly line had not produced labor's utopia. Quite the contrary. Increasing automation in the plants has

destroyed the last semiskilled tasks and eliminated the more interesting creative jobs.

Finally, Heilbroner discusses the emergence of the typical form of work in America today: "white-collar" labor, which the sociologist C. Wright Mills once described as "the symbol factory that produces the billion slips of paper that gear modern society into its daily shape." Most Americans today perform exactly the kind of work Jefferson feared: they labor for others, either in manufacturing or "service" jobs, the core of white-collar work, in which, as salesmen, clerks, lawyers, teachers, or bartenders, they depend upon "the casualties and caprice of customers." The goods and services turned out in the white-collar economy are often abstract and difficult to measure; success depends more upon a capacity to manage (and manipulate) other people within a large organization than upon ability to transform raw materials and natural resources; personal satisfaction, as Kenneth Lasson illustrates, varies with the particular individual and job.

At the same time, one could argue that Americans have now entered a Jeffersonian paradise: intellectual work has assumed critical importance and power. Although he debated the relative merits of agriculture and industry, Jefferson never expressed doubts concerning intellectual labor. A founder of the University of Virginia, he remained convinced that such institutions could produce in America a "natural aristocracy" of formally trained, sagacious leaders. The labors of the mind—scientific inquiry and speculative thought—seemed to Jefferson as important to America's destiny as the labor done on farms and work benches.

In America today there are more students pursuing college and university degrees than farmers raising food. Unquestionably, the American work force is the most educated (and perhaps the best educated) work force in the history of the world. The nation's economic machine—farms, factories, corner drugstores, supermarkets—runs as never before upon the mental energy provided by highly trained, intellectual workers in biology, chemistry, physics, psychology, mathematics, and business administration. Work that requires education, once a monopoly of the upper class in Jefferson's day, has been diffused throughout the occupational structure.

The Changing Labor Force

In his second article, Heilbroner analyzes the changing composition of the American labor force. Although white males, principally English-speaking tradesmen and farmers, constituted the original, non-Indian work force in America, the South became an exception to this pattern through the exploitation of African slave labor.

On the one hand, slavery represented the anomaly in an America that prided itself on its regime of "free labor," where individuals remained at liberty to pick and choose their callings. The impossibility of reconciling slavery with free labor as well as the fear that the institution would spread from the South to other regions led to its eventual destruction during the

Civil War. On the other hand, as Heilbroner notes, certain characteristics of southern slavery—its factory-like tempo on large plantations and the use of a racial "underclass" to perform "the dirty work" rejected by native-born Americans—reappeared time and again in America over the next one hundred years.

Although a few scholars, echoing the arguments made by slave-owners themselves before the Civil War, have emphasized the productive efficiencies of the system and the decent treatment accorded to the slaves, most historians of the subject reject these conclusions. Kenneth Stampp, for example, examines the methods of physical and psychological terror required to sustain a forced labor economy. He and others have also called attention to the chronic incidents of sabotage and malingering among the slaves and to the fact that "efficient" methods of production are impossible to calculate in a situation in which southern plantation owners held a virtual monopoly of world cotton cultivation. The coercive discipline of the slave economy is further revealed in Sarah Gudger's narrative of her life on a southern plantation.

This is not to say that southern apologists for slavery were wholly mistaken when they called attention to the grim conditions developing in northern industry among so-called "free" laborers. The wage system in the nineteenth century could be equally callous and despotic, whether one speaks of New England cotton mills in the 1850s, railroad construction in the 1870s, or steel and meat-packing plants in the 1890s. Industrialization, like slavery, required its "underclass" to perform the "dirty work" of America; by and large this "underclass" was found among the millions of immigrants who entered the United States between the 1840s and the 1920s. Without them, the miracle of American industrialization would not have been possible.

Few historians have contributed more to understanding this complex process than Herbert Gutman, whose well-known essay on work, culture, and society is included in the Reader. As Gutman points out, immigrant groups entered the industrial work force at different periods in time, yet each faced similar problems in adapting to the discipline of the factory or assembly line. The making of the American working class, largely out of immigrant material, involved bitter struggles between folkways and machine ways, between old ethnic habits and customs, often nurtured over centuries, and industrial rationality promoted by engineers and business managers. If scientific management finally triumphed, it was not without a battle, often reflected in the violent confrontations between workers and managers that littered America's industrial landscape from the Civil War through the Great Depression.

In addition to immigrants, Heilbroner writes, children constituted another "weak" portion of the labor force utilized by industrial employers. In the days before strong union organizations, collective bargaining, and minimum wage laws, children were an important source of family income, supplementing the meager earnings of parents. Owen Lovejoy,

writing at the turn of the century, described the frightful conditions endured by children in the coal mines: "the cloud of dust . . . so dense that light cannot penetrate, and even on bright days the breaker boys are compelled to wear mine lamps in their little caps to enable them to see the coal at their own feet." Equally horrendous conditions prevailed in textile mills, the principal bastion of child labor in the twentieth century.

Women, as Heilbroner notes, suffered peculiar injuries and injustices among American workers. During the period of intense industrial development, they formed part of the factory "underclass." Immigrant women, as well as native born, described in 1900 by the novelist Theodore Dreiser in *Sister Carrie*, found employment at repetitive tasks in the sweatshops of America, especially in the clothing and textile industries. With the rise of white-collar work, women achieved monopolistic domination of certain jobs, but the jobs were usually the least rewarding ones. Sexual segregation, like racial segregation, came to characterize large segments of the occupational hierarchy, until both barriers were openly challenged during the 1960s and 1970s.

In our sophisticated, post-industrial economy, in which the din of computers, Xerox machines, and electric typewriters has replaced for most workers the roar of factory machines, we tend to forget that dirty, arduous labor still remains the daily experience for many people in the American labor force. This is certainly true for migratory farm workers, the landless field hands, who harvest the bounty of American agriculture and who, like Manuel in Raymond Barrio's novel *Plum Plum Picker*, struggle each day against both nature and the primitive exploitation of other men.

The Work Ethic

The nature of work and the composition of the work force have changed in America over 200 years; so, too, Heilbroner suggests, has there been a change in the value placed upon work itself. Did a traditional "work ethic" exist in America? How has that ethic been modified?

Throughout the nineteenth century many observers of our society remarked on the great zeal with which all Americans—businessmen, artisans, farmers, industrial workers—went about their tasks. The Frenchman Tocqueville, for example, was struck by the seriousness and grim determination that marked the enterprising Americans he saw in the 1830s; frivolity and playfulness seemed alien to their work habits.

Economic necessity surely accounts for much of the frantic effort infusing American workers who, during the nineteenth century, virtually built an economy from scratch. Land could not be cleared, crops planted, mines dug, or railroad tracks laid in a hostile wilderness without unremitting, single-minded attention to the tasks at hand. No government or corporation stood ready to assist a financially-troubled farmer whose harvest failed; depletion allowances did not cushion the ups and downs of extractive industries; laid-off textile workers received no succor from state un-

employment compensation. The so-called Puritan work ethic, one suspects, rested more upon the practical fear of economic hardship than upon fine-spun theological considerations regarding the condition of one's soul.

In addition, Gutman emphasizes the fact that industrial work habits did not arise spontaneously from the hearts and minds of those who entered the labor force. Native-born Americans and immigrants entered factories and mills from preindustrial, rural backgrounds that lacked systematic conceptions of work discipline. Old habits and routines, many of them hostile to industrial modes of thinking and acting, had to be eradicated before the Puritan work ethic triumphed in America's factories.

The desire to "get ahead," Heilbroner notes, also served as a powerful incentive to work hard in America. Increased income, a better job, higher status—all seemed to await those who displayed ambition and diligence. Although the rags-to-riches myth may have been just that for a great many Americans who never moved up the ladder of success, there were enough visible "winners" to maintain the incentive among those who hoped to climb to the top.

Of course, the desire to gain more income through job mobility raises an intriguing problem: did Americans work hard because they enjoyed work, or did they work hard in order to ultimately escape from work? Considerable evidence suggests that the latter conclusion is more accurate—at least today—both for those who do physically taxing labor and those who carry out the dull routines of white-collar, bureaucratic labor.

A great many industrial and white-collar tasks in American society have never demanded much in the way of creativity or initiative. These repetitive jobs do not nourish the mind or spirit; they do not call forth what the economist Thorstein Veblen once called "the instinct of workmanship" because they are mere subdivisions of some larger enterprise or activity. The creativity of men and women, frustrated in the job role, seeks expression elsewhere. Sociologists Robert and Helen Lynd, writing about blue-collar and white-collar workers during the 1920s, noticed a decline in the work ethic as such and a rise in what might be called the consumption ethic. For many people in Middletown, work remained a central focus of their lives only to the extent that it provided money to purchase the personal satisfactions and pleasures denied them on the job.

The routinized tasks of our industrial and post-industrial economy have contributed to the decline of the traditional work ethic. But, as Heilbroner notes, other factors sapped its vitality as well, among them the rise of the "welfare state" and a philosophy of "entitlement" that encourages workers to demand more in the areas of job satisfaction and benefits.

Business failures, unemployment, and job injuries have not been banished from America's work environment, but, at least since the 1930s, the hardships and disgrace associated with these recurrent labor problems have been alleviated somewhat by government programs. Government subsidies or loans may save enterprises previously doomed by managerial incompetence; employees, laid off by General Motors or Ford, may receive

union, company, and state benefits. In addition, public and private insurance programs cover many accidents and, it is hoped, protect workers who have retired from the labor force.

However, as Heilbroner argues, it is much too early to write the epitaph of the work ethic in America. Many workers, unable to make ends meet, hold two jobs. Millions of others, subsisting on various forms of public welfare, remain eager to secure "decent" employment. Polly Toynbee's study of job placement problems faced by ghetto youth in Washington, D.C. suggests that they, too, expect society to provide not merely work but meaningful work. The expectations of even the most unskilled workers have increased as they find themselves on the outskirts of an affluent society, looking in on the comfortable members. If the work ethic is to survive in America, does it not require as a minimum that all those willing to work find work?

Beyond Work: Problems for the Future

But can America provide sufficient work for its citizens in the future? And will this work be of a kind that reduces job dissatisfaction and alienation? Heilbroner's final article discusses these important questions.

America will need not simply more jobs, but more jobs tailored to the characteristics of its working population. The service sector of the economy today employs 64 percent of the labor force, yet this sector may experience rapid automation and the displacement of workers, such as that which occurred previously in agriculture and manufacturing. Farmers, pushed off the land by consolidation and machinery, still found employment in America's factories during the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century. Industrial workers similarly moved into service employment. But where will the service workers go? How will they be recycled into new jobs if automation proceeds?

Two solutions, both involving a large measure of public and private planning, suggest themselves: the rate of technological innovation must be carefully controlled to reduce unemployment; and the government must be prepared to finance new, nontraditional work at public expense in areas such as health care, legal aid, conservation, pollution control, and education.

How widespread and serious is job alienation in America? That, no doubt, depends not only upon which workers you talk to, but also upon their expectations about work. Alienation itself is a tricky word used to describe a broad range of worker frustration and discontent, some trivial and some not trivial.

A skilled worker, sociologist Daniel Bell reminds us, "may find his job monotonous, and a chambermaid in a bustling metropolitan hotel may not. Nothing may be more deadly, perhaps, than the isolated hermetic life of the bank teller in his cage or of the elevator operator in his sealed jack-in-the-box."

Frustrated, unhappy workers are not, as Irving Kristol argues, only a

fantasy in the researcher's mind. Too much evidence exists to the contrary, including our own personal experiences. "Who has not," Heilbroner writes, "been exposed to the slovenly repairs of a bored mechanic, the total absence of interest of a store clerk, the outright aggression of a hospital attendant?" Tough-minded executives in the auto industry became sufficiently alarmed over manifestations of employee unrest—absenteeism, sabotage—to attempt some reorganization of the work process. They were not responding to the ideas of fuzzy-minded intellectuals.

The problems of job alienation, Bell writes, are very real, although the solutions may not be simple. Redesigning factory work, for example, in the interests of morale and creativity will demand the sacrifice of productivity. An increase in job satisfaction must be paid for at some point, perhaps in reduced output and higher costs to consumers. Reorganizing work in large, white-collar institutions—universities, insurance companies, hospitals—may prove to be equally expensive and even more taxing to human ingenuity.

Industrialization, Jefferson conceded long ago, was necessary for American economic independence and for the "comfort" of American citizens. The transformation of work since the 1780s has certainly fulfilled that promise of comfort. Where material comforts are concerned, the American worker enjoys the highest living standard and per capita income in the world. On the other hand, many of the issues relating to work and social values that troubled Jefferson remain unresolved. They are not material questions ultimately but concern rather the quality of human experience and social relationships under different forms of work.

In their approach to work, have Americans sacrificed too much individual self-expression and self-mastery in the interests of material comfort and efficiency at any price? If the yeoman ideal of the independent husbandman was neither realistic nor especially desirable, have we not reached the opposite extreme in modern assembly lines and white-collar "factories" where the work that people do brings satisfaction and pleasure only as it relates to the needs of the collective organization and where the connections between individual labor and individual achievement are at times extremely tenuous?

STUDY QUESTIONS

1. Describe how the character of the work experience in America has changed over time. What major factors influenced that process?

Suggested Guidelines

Structure your discussion around the central shifts from agricultural to factory to white-collar occupations as America developed from a preindustrial to an industrial to a post-industrial society.

Consider first how and why American farm life has changed from the pioneer era described by Bidwell and Falconer to today, as revealed in Studs Terkel's interview with Pierce Walker. Why did the market-oriented commercial farmer displace Jefferson's ideal self-sufficient husbandman, as Michael Parrish's Study Guide essay notes, and why are so few Americans now needed to supply agricultural products? How did new technology and agricultural business practices affect the farmer's life? What does Edwin Markham's poem about the brutish effect of unremitting physical labor suggest about agricultural life before the introduction of machinery and modern power sources? How different is the lot of today's migrant farm laborer, as described by Raymond Barrio?

Turning to the industrial work that replaced farm occupations, what factors transformed the life of factory workers from the relatively decent pattern of the early Lowell mills, which Heilbroner and Lucy Larcom describe, to the inhumane conditions of turn-of-the-century Pittsburgh steel mills and Chicago shoe factories as shown in the Reader selections by Leon Wolff and Theodore Dreiser? Consider here the role of heavy immigration and migration from the farms in increasing the industrial labor supply and delaying the development of union organization. Note, too, how technological innovations in agriculture, transportation, and communications, as well as in factory processes made the shift to an industrial economy possible. Consult Herbert Gutman regarding new industrial workers' adjustment to machine-oriented rhythms and factory discipline, and compare their life to the close contact with nature that agriculture involved. Then observe how the assembly line and automation further affected the character of factory work. If a rise in per capita income accompanied industrialization, as Edward Kirkland argues, were the benefits of industrial society equitably shared? Consider Robert and Helen Lynds' study, Daniel Bell's first article, "Work and Its Discontents," and William Serrin's account of automobile factory work. Do increased living standards and leisure time compensate for loss in job satisfaction? Do you agree with Irving Kristol's view that worker discontent is overdrawn?

What factors contributed to the increasing proportion of service occupations in post-industrial America that Heilbroner and Bell describe? How does the quality of "white-collar" work differ from "blue-collar"

occupations? Consider, too, Heilbroner's discussion of the decline in meaningful work opportunities and the welfare state's impact on worker attitudes. How did government policies since the 1930s affect workers' options and expectations? How has the increased importance of education in the "service economy" created new problems as well as new opportunities for different sectors of the work force? Finally, how does the quality of the average American work experience today compare to that of previous periods?

2. Describe the role the labor "underclass" has played in the American work scene.

Suggested Guidelines

Begin by reviewing Heilbroner's second article. Observe that the labor market responds to the forces of supply and demand and that the relative position of one worker over another depends on individual economic need, skills, cultural factors like race, ethnic, and sex prejudice, and opportunity to join with others to present a united front to employers in the bargaining process.

Note that the shortage of workers for hire in early America led employers to secure a labor supply by importing "indentured servants" and by turning to slavery. What do Kenneth Stampp and Sarah Gudger tell you about the conditions slaves endured and the methods owners employed in exploiting this labor "underclass"?

Why were most later immigrants forced to accept less desirable jobs and pay scales? Note that immigrants made the rapid development of the country and of the industrial system possible. Consider, however, how continued heavy immigration affected the American labor movement and delayed reform of working conditions. Why did children remain an important "soft element" in the labor force for so long, despite the efforts of reformers like Owen Lovejoy? Note that, as Raymond Barrio shows, migrant farm workers still perform onerous tasks for low pay. How do racial attitudes and ethnic factors contribute to the persistence of this labor underclass? What other racial groups remain at a competitive disadvantage in the labor market?

Finally, how has modern labor and welfare legislation affected the bargaining position of different elements in the labor force? Consider here Heilbroner's discussion of the new "philosophy of entitlement" in his third article and Myer Waxler's experience as a youth employment officer in "I Don't Walk Around with Jobs in My Pocket." Who today must still accept less desirable work? Will increasing unemployment add new elements to the labor underclass?

3. Discuss the evidence for and against the contention that the American work ethic is changing.

Suggested Guidelines

First define the traditional view of the American work ethic. Observe that Heilbroner, Herbert Gutman, and Daniel Bell generally agree on the ideas involved in that ethic but that they offer different views of how it was shaped and how widely it was held. In considering why Americans were willing to work hard, Heilbroner lists religious beliefs and employers' demands but stresses the opportunity to "get ahead" through individual effort in an open society. Was economic necessity or ambition more important than cultural traditions in shaping dominant American work attitudes? Note that Bidwell and Falconer show that Americans had to work hard just to survive in the wilderness but that the effort paid off well. Heilbroner points out that enough people did improve their status through frugality and hard work to reinforce acceptance of those values. Do the work attitudes Pierce Walker reveals suggest that the old work ethic is still strong, at least for the self-employed? Is opportunity to rise still an important work incentive?

According to Gutman and Bell, the Protestant religious work ethic was never common among wage workers. How do they support that claim? Gutman argues that employers imposed work habits that both native-born Americans and immigrants adopted reluctantly. When economic need forced workers to accept such conditions, did they come to accept the employer's moral rationale as well?

How have the values of the "consumption society" Bell describes influenced work attitudes? Note that although the Lynds' 1920s study showed a change in workers' motivation, from the intrinsic satisfactions of the job itself to the "instrumental" value of work in making possible leisure and consumer satisfactions, they still found that Middletown people worked very hard. Is the worker dissatisfaction William Serrin discusses evidence that the American work ethic has further deteriorated? How has the welfare state's "rising threshold of job acceptability" that Heilbroner identifies affected work attitudes? If the Protestant ethic is dead, why do Americans still look down on people who do not work to earn their keep? What evidence does Heilbroner find that Americans are still willing to work hard? Do the examples of worker hostility and poor performance, preoccupation with the pursuit of leisure, rising welfare rolls, and the emergence of the counterculture among young Americans suggest a contrary conclusion?

4. What major employment problems do Americans face in post-industrial society and what measures are proposed to meet those challenges?

Suggested Guidelines

Review first Daniel Bell's description of the post-industrial service economy. Then consider Heilbroner's warnings that population growth and continued automation will make it increasingly difficult to provide satis-

fying jobs for all Americans. According to Heilbroner, the primary challenge will be to create jobs that can be filled by an unevenly qualified work force that demands truly meaningful job opportunities. If education contributes to job dissatisfaction, does it also help to create new and fulfilling service job opportunities as Irving Kristol suggests? How could educational reforms help to eliminate the disparities in worker qualifications Heilbroner mentions? If the quality of work is already a serious problem, how promising are the experiments for making work more satisfying that Heilbroner describes? Heilbroner believes that government planning and public employment must play a greater role if jobs are to be found for workers displaced from both production and service jobs by automation. Do you see any alternatives to greater government involvement?

Consider, too, the constraints Bell believes Americans face in attempting reforms. If productivity cannot be increased as much in most service occupations as in goods production, how will we finance new jobs? How does the inflation caused by strong unions and "administered prices" affect our options? Can government meet the increased and competing political demands of various sectors of post-industrial society? In the face of strong foreign competition, can we afford to make jobs more satisfying if the price is lower productivity and falling sales? In this connection consider how the recent severe cut-backs in the auto industry, partially due to foreign competition, will affect the proposals for job reorganization that William Serrin describes.

Finally, if post-industrial society's employment challenges can only be met by greater government involvement, will the capitalist system Heilbroner hopes to preserve remain unchanged?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Robert L. Heilbroner

Article 2: The Changing Face of Labor

Bell, Daniel. *Work and Its Discontents.* Boston, 1956; reprinted in Bell, *The End of Ideology,* Glencoe, Ill., 1960. A discerning and brilliant short treatment of the problem of work and alienation by a leading American sociologist. Bell writes with clarity and precision. It is a test of a work if it still appears contemporary twenty years after its initial appearance. This one does.

Giedion, Sigfreid. *Mechanization Takes Command.* New York, 1948. One of the most interesting books ever assembled—one can hardly say "written" —about the effect of machines on work and life. Giedion has found extraordinary and fascinating pictures and sketches of technological change in fields as far apart as bathroom plumbing and railway sleeping cars, bicycles and breadmaking. Not a book to be read, but to be dipped into, studied, and enjoyed.

Marx, Leo. *The Machine in the Garden,* Garden City, N.Y., 1955. A literary critic surveys the impact of mechanization and industrialization on the rural self-image of nineteenth century America.

Mills, C. Wright. *White Collar.* New York, 1956. Mills was one of the most acidulous and incisive critics of American society. This dissection of the world of the middle class casts an ominous shadow over the cheery pastel environment of the office. (Mills calls it The Enormous File.) Although the portrait is probably overdrawn, the book is very much worth reading and pondering.

Mumford, Lewis. *Technics and Civilization.* New York, 1943. A classic study of the impact of technology by a famous humanist and social critic. The book is avowedly partisan and suffers a little from "sociologese," but it has biting phrases and sharp insights that make it well worth reading.

Sinclair, Upton. *The Jungle.* New York, 1906. An old-fashioned book today, this was once a very important source of public enlightenment and legislative change. It still gives an unforgettable portrait of working conditions in the stockyards.

Terkel, Studs. *Working.* New York, 1972, 1974. Terkel is a skilled interviewer, and this book is a collection of taped interviews that he has conducted over the past years. Dozens of persons speak about their work in dozens of fields, usually in tones of boredom and disaffection. Too long to read straight through, the book is valuable for glimpses of working life that would otherwise be closed to us.

Walker, Charles, and Robert Guest. *The Man on the Assembly Line*. Cambridge, Mass., 1952. A tour of an assembly line under the guidance of a sociologist and an industrial economist. This is one of the first modern studies of the special fatigues and frustrations of assembly line work. It gives a clear, unemotional picture of what industrial work is like.

Article 3: The Changing Labor Force

Handlin, Oscar. *The Uprooted*. New York, 1951. This Pulitzer Prize winning history of immigration is an excellent place from which to gain an initial impression of the effect of America on its entering poor and of the poor on the country they entered. Chapter 3, "Daily Bread," deals specifically with work, but the whole work is relevant to our theme.

Heilbroner, Robert, and Lester Thurow. *The Economic Problem*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974. It is probably useful to learn something of the vocabulary and ideas of contemporary economics with regard to work. In this text the problem is treated in Chapters 20 and 33.

Nevins, Allan. *Ford, the Times, the Man, the Company*. New York, 1954, 1957, 1963. A three volume study (the last two in joint authorship with Frank Ernest Hill) of the career of Ford, the man and the enterprise. The chapters on labor—Vol. I, Chapter 21; Vol. II, Chapter 20; and Vol. III, Chapters 2 and 6—are a capsule history of the evolution of an industrial work force and its struggle for unionization.

Taylor, Frederick Winslow. *Scientific Management*. New York, 1947. This book contains some of Taylor's tracts as well as his testimony before various commissions. It is certainly not a book to be read for pleasure, but it is indispensable for anyone who wishes to learn, at first hand, about the origins of Taylorism. The tone of the man—his perfectly conscious elitism—comes through as sharply as his proposals to turn men into human machines.

Ware, Norman. *The Industrial Worker, 1840-1860*. Original edition, 1924, reprinted Gloucester, Mass., 1958. A historian's careful reconstruction of the coming of industrial work to the pre-Civil War economy. Interesting discussions of the early mills, the recruitment of the labor force, and the slowly changing conditions of work.

Article 4: The Work Ethic

Berg, Ivar. *The Great Training Robbery*. New York, 1970. An exposé, by a highly trained economist, of the continuously rising, but largely empty, "qualifications" for obtaining jobs. One now needs a high school diploma to run a freight elevator. Berg discusses the changing content of actual work and the effects of this spurious upgrading of qualifications on the morale of the labor force.

Chinoy, Eli. *Automobile Workers and the American Dream*. Garden City, N.Y., 1955. Chinoy has investigated the life, the working day, and the

aspirations of the auto worker. A scholarly work, it is nevertheless accessible to and invaluable for anyone interested in a case history of "workers' dissatisfaction."

Thernstrom, Stephan. *The Other Bostonians*. Cambridge, Mass., 1973. A well-known contemporary historian examines the social landscape of the early nineteenth century to discover the existence of poverty and distress behind the prosperous facade of middle class urban life. A brilliant glimpse into the dark alleys of the past—alleys whose very existence we have forgotten or ignored.

Weber, Max. *The Protestant Ethic*. New York, 1952. This is one of the most influential sociological books ever written. Weber suggests that there is a deep-rooted connection between the rise of Calvinism and the development of the capitalist spirit. Not to be missed.

Article 5: Beyond Work: Problems for the Future

Braverman, Harry. *Labor and Monopoly Capital*. New York, 1974. This is one of the most important and disturbing books of recent years, an absolute must for anyone interested in the subject of labor. Braverman discusses the degradation of work under the impact of technology guided by the economic imperatives of capitalist enterprise. The analysis uses the ideas of Marxism but is not doctrinaire—it recognizes that the same deformations to be found in the United States are visible in the Soviet Union. Scholarly in tone, deeply humanistic in intent, wide ranging in its command of facts, this is a superb and searing historical critique.

Hunnius, Gerry, G. David Garson, and John Case. *Workers' Control*. New York, 1973. A collection of essays on the problem of transferring the management function to the work force itself. The problem is critically examined, generally from a sympathetic position, and the results of efforts in other nations are discussed. A good compendium on a subject of great importance.

Silverman, Bertram, and Murray Yanowitch. *The Worker in "Post Industrial" Capitalism*. Glencoe, Ill., 1974. As the quotation marks in the title indicate, the editors of this book do not think that post-industrial capitalism is significantly different from industrial capitalism. This is a collection of essays on many aspects of the labor problem—the nature of the working "class," the social pressures that shape work mentality, the distribution of income, the chances for radical social change. A very comprehensive and useful survey of the entire field.

Special Task Force of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. *Work in America*. Cambridge, Mass., 1973. This study of work dissatisfaction in the United States discusses the wave of unrest that has characterized the labor force in recent years. Less urgent during a period of recession, the problems it raises are likely to reappear when economic conditions improve.

UNIT TWO:

"THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA . . ."

KEY CONCEPTS

Free private enterprise describes a capitalist economic system in which the means of production is privately owned and operated for personal profit in an open, competitive market of goods and services, free of governmental interference. The forces of supply and demand alone determine production, wages, and prices. As an economic philosophy, "free enterprise" developed in reaction to the *mercantilist* doctrines in practice in the eighteenth century, under which government intervened actively in economic decision making. The economic thinkers who advocated free enterprise, such as Adam Smith who published *The Wealth of Nations* in 1776, believed that the self-interested actions of individuals would automatically benefit society as a whole if government did not interfere in the process. French economists adopted the term *laissez faire*, which means approximately "let things alone," to describe this philosophy. Free enterprise has been more an ideal than a reality in the United States, because government has always played an important role in the economy and competition has never been entirely open.

Mixed economy combines spontaneous market forces and government controls. In the American mixed economy most economic decisions result from the operation of supply and demand; but federal, state, and local government activities, policies, and regulations significantly affect the marketplace. Taxation is the major tool for government intervention in the economy, but government also regulates certain activities, subsidizes some industries, and operates businesses in competition with private enterprise, such as the federal postal service and local schools.

Business cycles. One feature of free enterprise capitalism is the recurring pattern of economic fluctuation from prosperity to recession, depression, and recovery called business cycles. In periods of prosperity investment increases, and profits, production, prices, and employment rise. Overproduction and speculation then result in lower prices and decreased economic activity called recession. If not reversed, recession leads to depression in which economic activity slows down radically, and severe unemployment and minimal investment occur. Recovery takes place when costs adjust to the lower price level, stockpiles of goods are consumed, and savings begin to accumulate for new investment, which is made attractive by the prospect of increased profits. Business cycles have occurred with some regularity and varying severity, but, in spite of government efforts since the 1930s, they are not yet truly predictable or controllable.

Stagflation. Recently the business cycle has failed to follow the classic pattern. Recession or stagnation has been accompanied by inflation rather

than the decline in prices that should result from a drop in demand, a condition analysts now call stagflation. Prices continue to rise for a variety of interrelated and debated reasons, and the process, like the modern economy itself, is little understood. Among the factors involved are government failure to match taxation to expenditures, powerful corporations and unions that can keep wages and prices high despite demand decline, government monetary policies, and foreign control of oil, which has raised prices throughout the economy.

Competition and monopoly. Competition is the mainspring of free enterprise capitalism. It forces profit-seeking producers to try to improve their product or service or lower their costs and prices, thus encouraging efficiency and innovation to the benefit of the consumer. The number of sellers in a market determines the degree of competition that prevails. In America most market situations fall between the extremes of *perfect competition* (in which the number of sellers is large enough that none can control the product's price) and *pure monopoly* (in which there is only one seller for a commodity for which there is no substitute). Today, *oligopoly* (few sellers) characterizes many product areas where relatively few giant corporations dominate the market.

Income distribution refers to the way in which income is distributed among the various individuals in a society. As Samuelson points out, the relative distribution of income in the United States has changed little since 1945 despite "redistributive" government policies like the graduated income tax and inheritance levies. *Progressive tax rates,* which set an increasingly higher rate as the amount taxed rises, tend to redistribute wealth, while *regressive tax rates* fall more heavily on the poor, because the amount paid represents a higher proportion of disposable income.

Advertising and public policy. Government regulation or taxation of advertising involves social as well as economic issues. Advertising has become a central mechanism in the modern marketing of goods and services as well as the major source of financial support for the American free press and radio and television. Proponents claim that advertising informs consumers of product availability and, by creating demand, stimulates economic activity and fosters competition; critics consider it wasteful of talents and resources as well as a harmful tool that promotes monopolistic market control. American law already restricts advertising of certain kinds of products, like tobacco and alcohol, that are considered injurious to health. In addition, as Samuelson points out, concern that advertising techniques dominate American political life recently contributed to passage of legislation limiting candidates' campaign expenditures.

Gross National Product (GNP) is the total value of goods and services produced in a year as measured by a government formula. The GNP is one of the major indices of business activity by which government economic policy is determined; it is also used to measure the country's rate of *economic growth*.

Economic growth. Until recently the positive value of a continued rise in production and consumption based on demands created by increased population has been an accepted tenet of economic policy. Now, however, both practical and moral questions are being raised as to whether such growth in the industrialized nations can or should continue if it takes place at the expense of people in undeveloped areas of the world and if it exhausts the earth's finite resources and threatens global ecological balance.

ARTICLES AND READINGS

Michael E. Parrish

Paul Samuelson's four articles concern the past, present, and future of economic policy in America, a topic of more than passing interest in a bicentennial season punctuated by urban fiscal crises, inflation, unemployment, resource shortages, and struggles between the President and Congress over taxation and spending. In the broadest sense, economic policy touches every life in America. It determines what kind of jobs we hold or whether we hold a job at all; what we eat and what we wear; how warm our homes will be and whether new homes can be constructed; what kind of future our children will inherit. These momentous issues are decided through the actions of millions of employers, workers, consumers, and government planners who today operate our incredibly complex mixed economic system that blends private decision-making with public responsibility.

Our history as a nation has been marked by periodic struggles over questions of economic policy. Hamilton battled with Jefferson and Madison over the debts of the Revolution and the virtues of a protective tariff; Jackson warred against Mr. Biddle's Bank; the Populists attempted to subdue the railroads; and Franklin Roosevelt jousted with Wall Street.

These conflicts stirred powerful emotions at the time, but they disguised a fundamental consensus over the *ends* of economic policy that until recently had not been seriously disputed in America. That consensus, shared by farmers and bankers, steel magnates and socialists, rested upon a belief in the necessity and desirability of economic growth as the basis of individual and collective happiness. In America more of everything—wheat, coal, steel, railroads, washing machines, and razor blades—was usually regarded as better than less; as a result, conflicts over economic policy have largely been disputes concerning the best practical method of securing more of everything for everybody. From the perspective of many Americans during the past 200 years, the market or free enterprise system has seemed to provide the best, most efficient method of realizing the goal of economic growth.

Private Enterprise

Samuelson's first article discusses the role played by free enterprise and the market in the historical evolution of economic policy in America. By and large, he points out, Americans have allowed the market (individual desires backed by money) to determine "*what* goods will be produced, *how* they are to be produced, and how they are *to be distributed* among the rich, poor, and middle classes."

The essential principles of the free enterprise system are also outlined in the Reader by the economist Sumner Slichter. These principles, emphasizing maximum independence and choice for the individual citizen, fit

comfortably with other aspects of American thought and culture in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. "It may seem a strange way of doing," Slichter writes, "but we organize industry by, in effect, saying to each individual, 'Choose your own occupation. Produce what you like. . . . You are equally free to refuse to buy or sell whenever you please and for any reason or no reason.' This is what we mean by free private enterprise. Under it the government confines itself primarily to the suppression of fraud and violence and to the enforcement of contracts. It does not itself engage in or attempt to guide the course of industry."

At the same time, of course, Americans have also placed a high value upon the idea of equality, above all, equality of opportunity. When the free enterprise system threatened to undermine the American credo of equality, it was modified through governmental intervention that restored balance in the marketplace.

For much of the nineteenth century, the free enterprise system in America functioned as more than an economic standard. It also served as a foundation of morality and social order. It provided an explanation for the outcomes of life. The market symbolized personal freedom and responsibility. The market did not assign a fixed value to persons or things; instead, competition determined value through the give and take of supply and demand. The best products, ideas, and ultimately persons, would rise to the top of the market. Personal success in life became equated with material acquisition.

Russell Conwell's "Acres of Diamonds," the stories of Horatio Alger Jr., and Andrew Carnegie's autobiography all exhibit the traditional success ethic that nineteenth-century Americans attributed to the wholesome operations of the marketplace and free enterprise. Everyone, Conwell implied, should aspire to become very rich; money measured a person's character and social value; the poor were basically undeserving because they had been tested in the marketplace and found deficient—they lacked either sufficient ambition or intelligence.

To this simple formula, the novelist Alger added the ingredient of luck that came to those who displayed pluck. The market, Alger suggested, rewarded hard work and intelligence, but luck might make the difference between the millionaire and the mere person of means. Carnegie, for example, attributed his success to ambition, frugal habits, and a chance inquiry by the manager of the telegraph office to Uncle Hogan over a game of draughts. "Upon such trifles," he wrote, "do the most momentous consequences hang. A word, a look, an accent, may affect the destiny not only of individuals, but of nations." In the calculus of the market, Carnegie implied, good fortune might count as much as pious habits and business cunning.

Not everyone, Samuelson writes, could pick a "lucky number in the ruthless lottery of historical capitalism." This statement is born out by recent historical research, which suggests that social mobility increased for some groups in American society, but it remained largely constant for

others. For every Carnegie who gained success in steel production hundreds went bankrupt. Alger-like tycoons, rising from rags to riches, certainly were not the norm in American society at any time; but neither, of course, were the vagabonds and tramps who disturbed the peace of many communities during recurrent economic depressions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The truth of the market, of course, lay somewhere between these extremes. Most Americans became neither millionaires nor hoboes as a consequence of the free enterprise system. They tasted sufficient upward mobility and security to retain their belief in the system—at least until the shattering experience of the Great Depression ushered in the truly mixed economy of private choice and public responsibility.

Past and present critics of the free enterprise system have focused their attack upon a number of issues. Many, such as Henry Demarest Lloyd, combined ethical and economic objections still echoed today in the writings of Lloyd's ideological descendent Ralph Nader, the consumer advocate who is also concerned with the power of corporations and the efficiency and morality of unregulated free enterprise.

The competitive ethos of private enterprise and the market, Lloyd wrote in 1894, emphasized the brutal, materialistic aspects of human nature. Social aggression, not social cooperation received the highest praise and rewards in such an economic system. "We have chartered," Lloyd wrote, "the self-interest of the individual as the rightful sovereign of conduct, we have taught that the scramble for profit is the best method of administering the riches of the earth . . . that strength gives the strong in the market the right to destroy his neighbor."

Lloyd and others also pointed out that the regime of free enterprise and competition actually worked to undermine itself. Equality in the market vanished when those who triumphed gained monopolistic control. Supply and demand did not flourish where one, two, or three companies dominated particular sectors of the economy. Most of the successful businessmen in Lloyd's time and in our own, too, have in fact attempted by one means or another (price-fixing, cartels, mergers) to eliminate the impact of the market and competition upon their respective companies. What little competition remains in American economic life today has largely been the product not of spontaneous market forces, but of anti-trust laws.

Two factors conspired to undermine the ideological and practical basis of the free enterprise system. In the first place, recurrent economic depressions threatened its long-term stability because they brought financial ruin to many entrepreneurs and unemployment to millions of disillusioned workers who could not understand why they were denied work in a land of opportunity. Secondly, the creation of giant corporations tended to erode belief in the system. How could the market fulfill its moral or economic role when a few corporate units exercised such extraordinary power? And if the market led ultimately to these great inequalities, how could it remain a valid testing ground for individual merit and enterprise?

Between the 1880s and the 1940s many groups in American society sought relief from the government for the disadvantages they suffered in the marketplace as a consequence of inequality in their bargaining position. Farmers and shippers, for example, as the novelist Frank Norris illustrated in *The Octopus*, were threatened with strangulation by the railroads. They demanded and received public regulation of railroad rates that they were otherwise powerless to influence. Consumers, forced to buy many products from a limited number of corporate giants, gained from the Food and Drug Administration and the Federal Trade Commission a measure of protection denied to them by the operations of the market alone.

American workers, forced to bargain individually with their corporate employers, finally received the government-protected right to organize unions and negotiate contracts as a group. The government imposed limitations upon working hours, set minimum wages, and required employers and employees to join a mandatory, state-run retirement program. Finally, the government provided jobs for those without employment in the private sector and direct cash payments to many unable to work. A mixed economy, blending private enterprise, market forces, and a large dose of government regulation, emerged as the new American consensus on economic policy after Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal.

The Mixed Economy

Under Roosevelt the federal government assumed open, direct responsibility for the economic welfare of all American citizens. At the time, many of FDR's innovations, especially those that involved government spending, seemed terribly radical. When General Motors went into debt in order to buy equipment, hire workers, and build automobiles, it was regarded as sound economic policy; when the federal government went into debt, bought equipment, hired workers, and built bridges, it was regarded as unsound economic policy.

The absurdity of this position was noted by many of FDR's supporters, but conservatives remained unconvinced. Some of the latter, led by Herbert Hoover, objected to direct federal aid to the unemployed on the grounds that it would sound the death knell of free enterprise and self-reliance. Federal relief payments, Hoover argued, would destroy both the charitable instincts of the American people and sap their enterprising spirit. As helpless wards of the government, Americans would become easy victims of political manipulation and tyranny.

In retrospect, of course, the New Deal did not involve a great departure from American traditions of economic policy. Government, both state and federal, had always been an important source of economic assistance and planning, even in the high-flying days of nineteenth-century capitalism. Transport companies, canals, and especially railroads received lavish public aid. Tariffs protected manufacturers from foreign competition. Government at all levels appropriated taxes and spent the proceeds to

attract industry, to clear harbors, to provide irrigation, and, generally, to promote economic growth beneficial to individual businessmen and farmers.

Roosevelt's New Deal built upon this already existing foundation of governmental intervention. While many staunch defenders of free enterprise wrung their hands in despair, the more sophisticated businessmen at the time knew that the New Deal had preserved the basics of capitalism and strengthened free enterprise. The commercial banking system, for example, emerged from the 1930s reorganized and revitalized, complete with an insurance program to protect depositors and bankers. The stock exchanges had been fumigated, purged of the worst forms of chicanery that undermined confidence among investors; the benefit checks paid to farmers, the unemployed, and the elderly ultimately flowed into the cash registers of manufacturers. It required six years of heavy war-time demand to finally lift the American economy from the Great Depression, but the framework of the mixed economy, what Samuelson calls "a mixture of market forces and government controls," had been securely erected.

The extent to which government controls should remain in force, however, is still the subject of public debate. President Ford and the Congress, for instance, have disagreed on the question of price controls on natural gas: the President has expressed confidence that the market will provide the proper blend of supply and price; critics of the President are not as certain. They also look in a skeptical manner upon the President's announced intention to reduce the regulatory powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The balance sheet of the mixed economy after thirty-five years is without question a checkered one. Most Americans have come to enjoy the highest standard of living in the world through a combination of government spending, private investment, and tax cuts designed to stimulate, by one means or another, the consumer demand that keeps the wheels of industry turning. Yet amidst this affluence, the degree of corporate consolidation has not been reduced, nor has the income gap between the very rich and the very poor. The level of human comfort—housing, food, transportation, medical care—remains tied largely to each person's ability to purchase these goods and services in the marketplace, although the government now assures a minimal level of health care and subsistence. Income, not need, still determines the distribution of many critical resources.

Although the market continues to hold sway in American life, governmental intervention into the economy has also increased since the 1930s, and not all of it has been of great benefit to the poor or disadvantaged. As the economist George Stigler notes in the Reader, many government programs enrich the already well-to-do or harm consumers by protecting inefficient industries from the rigors of competition. "Our cotton program," he writes, "was intended to enrich poor cotton farmers, increase

. . . production, foster foreign markets, and stabilize domestic consumption. It is an open question whether 28 years of our farm program have done as much for poor cotton farmers as the trucking industry."

Critics of government intervention point out those areas of our economic life in which state efforts have compounded inequality, produced waste, and stifled human creativity. At the same time we should be aware of the fact that government does not hold a monopoly on these defects; many private sector institutions can be faulted on the same grounds. Nor is it easy, as Samuelson points out in his Reader selection, to make a blanket condemnation of state intervention or to specify those areas where governmental efforts should be cut back. "No a priori reasoning," he writes, "has yet been found to demarcate the role of nongovernment and of government."

Advertising

In his third article Samuelson discusses one aspect of American economic policy that has generated much controversy: advertising. Few people remain neutral on the question of its economic value or impact upon our society.

Many critics of the advertising industry argue that its techniques distort the operations of the market and stifle genuine competition among enterprises. Consumers, these critics assert, find it difficult to make a free, informed choice in situations where they are constantly bombarded with tantalizing product images generated by Madison Avenue.

For the purposes of the advertising agency and its clients, facts are less important than the production of fantasy. Companies with the largest advertising budgets, moreover, can dominate many product areas; instead of competing with one another in terms of price and quality, firms spend millions of dollars attempting to lure customers by the use of marginal product differences, packaging, and psychological gimmicks.

David Potter does not limit his objections to these economic issues. He questions the moral legitimacy of an institution devoted exclusively to the ethic of consumption. Other social institutions in American life, he notes, attempt to inspire concern for others or impart useful skills. Advertising, unlike the church or the school, "appeals primarily to the desires, the wants . . . of the individual, and it . . . offers as its goals a power to command the envy of others by outstripping them in the consumption of goods and services."

The advertising industry does not, of course, lack for defenders. The American consumer, such supporters as the economist L. G. Telser argue, is not a helpless, "brainwashed" robot, incapable of sifting out truth from fiction. He or she can distinguish the "puffing" and boasting of cereal companies in the same way that judgments are made about political candidates who usually engage in hyperbolic oratory.

In addition, defenders of the industry argue, advertising may stimulate competition for the consumer's dollar between firms in different but

related product areas. Finally, the censorship of commercial advertising might set a dangerous precedent for other areas of communication as well. Who can be so wise as to draw the line between desirable, uplifting ideas and those dangerous to public welfare?

Limits to Growth?

Preoccupied for 200 years with questions of economic growth, Americans now face a future in which many of their cherished habits and beliefs will be severely tested. And, in the opinion of many experts, the choices made will determine not only our own immediate welfare and that of our children but the long-term capacity of the earth to sustain human life itself. As the most prosperous, technologically sophisticated nation on the earth, producing over 20 percent of the goods and services of the world, our economic policies can decisively influence the course of world economic policies, especially in the critically important areas of resource depletion and environmental pollution.

Samuelson remains rather optimistic on many of these issues, as reflected in his final article. He clearly believes that increased economic growth both in America (3.5 percent per year) and in the world will and should continue. Such growth, he believes, will prove to be beneficial to the extent that standards of living are raised in the less developed regions of the world either through a voluntary transfer of GNP from the richer countries or through the demand by less developed nations for higher prices for their foods, fibers, and raw materials. On this point, Samuelson finds support from Carl Kaysen and other "doomsday" model critics who argue that increased world economic growth provides the only solution to the poverty and human misery characteristic of many less developed countries.

Nor is Samuelson impressed with those who forecast the depletion of natural resources or long-term environmental collapse resulting from the increased industrial wastes produced by economic growth. Both Samuelson and Kaysen place great faith in the ability of Americans and others in the advanced nations to find the proper technical solutions to these problems.

Robert Heilbroner remains more pessimistic. The Spaceship Earth, he points out, cannot survive if *all* the passengers utilize resources and produce waste products equal to the average American or European. This conclusion leads Heilbroner and those experts who prepared the Club of Rome's report on "Limits to Growth" to argue that the less developed nations will never achieve living standards comparable to those in America; in addition, American living standards may need to be lowered "if the ship is ever to be converted to a one-class cruise" capable of supporting all of the passengers for the long run.

Instead of further economic growth, Heilbroner and the Club of Rome experts both urge greater emphasis in the developed nations upon a stabilized rate of resource use and waste disposal. What economic growth does

take place should be limited to those areas (education, for example) that require very little consumption of raw materials and generate low levels of environmental pollution. This strategy, of course, would require harsh governmental controls or incentives to transfer capital from existing profitable uses in industry to less profitable "uneconomic" uses such as increased food production. An economic system that emphasizes stabilized rates of resource exploitation, industrial output, and waste disposal, however, would be far removed from the assumptions and practices of America's free enterprise system and mixed economy in which the values of total growth and individual consumption have been practiced for 200 years.

STUDY QUESTIONS

1. How "free" is American enterprise? How "free" should it be?

Suggested Guidelines

First consider Sumner Slichter's description of a "free enterprise" economy and Samuelson's analysis of the American economic system. How close to the ideal of free enterprise does the American "mixed economy" come? Was our economy ever free of government intervention? Why did the mixed economy evolve when the free enterprise philosophy was so widely held? In this connection note the negative factors in the economy that resulted in demands for government participation: the severe unemployment and loss of savings and investment during recurrent depressions and the development of business combinations and monopolistic practices that drove competitors out of business and put consumers at the mercy of suppliers. Consider here Henry Demarest Lloyd's nineteenth-century critique of monopoly and the social values it reflected. Note also that although many individuals became well-to-do or at least improved their economic position, others did not, and the disparity between rich and poor in America brought social problems that private charitable efforts failed to meet. What other factors led Americans to modify free enterprise so significantly? If the Great Depression of the 1930s was a major impetus to the mixed economy, do you agree with Franklin Roosevelt's statement that "new conditions impose new requirements on government"?

Now evaluate present day criticisms of government's role. How convincing are Ralph Nader's arguments in favor of redirecting government intervention so as to benefit and protect the consumer? Consider George Stigler's analysis of what government can realistically hope to achieve. Does Samuelson's Reader article succeed in rebutting Stigler's arguments? What "warts" on the mixed-economy picture does Samuelson list? Finally, what reforms, if any, would you support to effect a more equitable operation of our economic system?

2. Describe the elements in the American self-help success philosophy revealed in Samuelson's articles and in the readings. Is that philosophy realistic today?

Suggested Guidelines

First note that an important element in the American success ethic was that it appeared to be continually validated by the performance of some individuals. America has indeed been a "land of opportunity" where individuals could hope to rise in the world through their own efforts, with few fixed social barriers to hinder them. Observe that Samuelson points out that the bounty of the environment—plentiful land and resources and a favorable climate—increased Americans' chances of improving their condition and that the economic system did in fact contribute to a higher general living standard. Many Americans did improve their situation, and, although few matched the spectacular achievements of the self-made men Samuelson cites, such examples encouraged others to believe in and support the success ethic.

Now consider how Russell Conwell's "Acres of Diamonds," the selection from a Horatio Alger story, and Carnegie's autobiography illustrate the self-help philosophy. Have conditions or attitudes changed since their day? Review the discussion of the Protestant work ethic in Unit I, recalling that financial success became a primary measure of an individual's moral worth. What attitudes toward the unsuccessful does Conwell reveal? Would he approve of the modern public welfare system? Besides "pluck and luck," what habits does the Alger story recommend to the would-be self-made man? How important was luck in Andrew Carnegie's early career? In Carnegie's day, some would argue, the good works of millionaires in supporting philanthropies justified their larger share of the nation's wealth. Is that still true today? The passing of the frontier and the maturing of the economy have eliminated some of the natural advantages Americans enjoyed in the struggle for success, but the opportunity for self-advancement still exists, as the example of Edwin Land, the inventor of the Polaroid camera, suggests. Has progressive taxation altered the rewards and incentives of striving for success? Has welfare undermined the self-help philosophy? Finally, are American attitudes toward success now more humane than in the era of unbridled competition?

3. Compare the arguments defending and condemning American advertising. Which are most convincing? Why? Is greater government regulation of advertising necessary?

Suggested Guidelines

Observe that advertising involves economic, social, and political issues. As to its economic value, note that Samuelson agrees that advertising helps to bring worthy products to the public's attention, although it also creates demand for products of questionable real value. Consider too that

although David Potter goes on to question the social effects of advertising, he points out that its phenomenal growth accompanied the modern economy of abundance. Product differentiation through advertising became an essential economic function if demand was to match an indefinitely expanding supply. Critics like Ralph Nader, however, claim that the consumer must bear the added cost of some products' expensive advertising, for which he or she receives no additional value. Another economic criticism is that advertising encourages monopoly; but Samuelson cites objective economists' findings that it actually promotes competition among producers, a position that L. G. Telser also supports. Potter also decries the fact that advertising seeks primarily to fit the consumer to the product rather than the product to the consumer, limiting economic choices. Nader strongly criticizes the economic waste involved in the misrepresentation that induces consumers to purchase beauty and diet "aids" and medicines that are valueless for the purposes they advertise. Can the consumer be trusted to judge advertising claims, or must government act to protect him?

Now consider Potter's critique of the deeper effects of advertising on our social values. As an "institution for social control," does advertising exhibit a lack of responsibility in encouraging the consumer mentality and exalting the materialistic virtues of consumption? Do you agree with his claim that advertising seriously lowers the cultural life of the nation by seeking the "least common denominator" in the magazines and media programs it finances? How does this criticism tie in with Samuelson's discussion of the relationship of advertising techniques to our political system?

If, as Samuelson points out, our free press and media system depends on advertising, is its full prohibition feasible? What kinds of problems would taxation of advertising raise? If government regulation has so far been the only acceptable alternative, should it go further or is its present limitation, primarily on health related products, sufficient? Is government regulation justified as a protection to the public, or does it unduly limit economic freedom?

4. Consider the evidence concerning America's future economic growth. Does continued growth or a no-growth economy seem to you most likely to occur?

Suggested Guidelines

Observe that American economic growth has been an unquestioned national objective, upon which prosperity was believed to depend. Now, however, there is considerable debate as to whether that growth pattern can or should continue.

Consider first Samuelson's discussion of our prospects for further economic growth. Why is he optimistic in his outlook, and how does he

reconcile our growth expectations with the increasing demands of the less developed countries? Does his scenario seem more realistic to you than the projections of the "Limits to Growth" group? If you accept their conclusions, do you believe Americans or other peoples are willing or able to take the kind of immediate steps toward stabilizing population, reducing resource consumption and pollution, diverting capital to food production and soil enrichment, and improving industrial product durability that the model requires? How does Carl Kaysen fault that study?

What does Robert Heilbroner's article suggest about the likelihood of our meeting the threat to world ecology that continued growth involves? How does he assess our ability to share the world's resources equitably with other countries? Are his warnings regarding overpopulation and pollution overdrawn? How do the proposals he questions for sharing the GNP of developed nations with underdeveloped countries differ from Samuelson's similar suggestion? What prospects does Heilbroner see for the survival of capitalism if economic growth cannot continue? How likely is the new political reform movement Heilbroner sees as a possible solution?

Considering these several different warnings and reassurances, what kind of scenario of American economic growth would you now write?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Paul A. Samuelson

Article 6: Private Enterprise as an American Way of Life

Galbraith, John Kenneth. *The Affluent Society*. Boston, 1969. This provides a readable and provocative analysis of what the modern American society is like.

Friedman, Milton. *Capitalism and Freedom*. Chicago, 1962. Friedman is an enthusiastic and persuasive defender of unlimited capitalism.

Heilbroner, Robert L. *The Worldly Philosophers* (4th ed.). New York, 1972. This has been a best seller for its readable account of past famous economists and their work.

Potter, David M. *People of Plenty*. Chicago, 1954. The key to United States history, this book persuasively argues, is to be found not so much in the western frontier as in our early and maintained prosperity.

Article 7: The American Mixed Economy

Hayek, Friedrich A. *The Road to Serfdom*. Chicago, 1965. An elegant if somewhat hysterical warning that good intentions for reform may end in totalitarian tyranny.

Heller, Walter W. *New Dimensions of Political Economy*. Cambridge, Mass., 1966. These lectures by President Kennedy's chief economic advisor describe the state of the mixed economy just before the post-Vietnam tensions began to challenge its equilibrium.

Schumpeter, Joseph A. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. New York, 1950. Schumpeter, a world famous economist, describes in his best book the forces that tended to transform historical capitalism. A rewarding, if not easy, book.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. *The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal*. Boston, 1957. This gives a readable account worth sampling of the transformation from Hoover's rugged individualism to FDR's New Deal.

Article 8: Advertising and the Shaping of American Beliefs

Cheit, F. (ed.). *The Business Establishment*. New York, 1964. Goes beyond advertising to the broad issues of business ideology.

Divita, S. F. (ed.). *Advertising and the Public Interest*. Chicago, 1974. This book and the one by Simon are symposia that present a spread of views on advertising, pro and con.

Nicosia, Francesco M. *Advertising, Management and Society: A Business Point of View*. New York, 1974. Presents the business viewpoint of advertising.

Simon, Julian L., *Issues in the Economics of Advertising*. Urbana, Ill., 1970. See Divita.

Article 9: Limits to Growth: What Lies Ahead.

Commoner, Barry. *Science and Survival*. New York, 1966. A biological scientist stresses the need to return to a simple, self-cycling mode of life.

Daedalus. *The No-Growth Society*. Cambridge, Mass., 1973. A symposium by a variety of experts on the question of growth.

Meadows, Donnella H., *et.al. The Limits to Growth*. New York, 1972. The authority of the computer is invoked to sound the alarm of overpopulation and doomsday ahead.

Nordhaus, William, and James Tobin. "Is Growth Obsolete?" *Fiftieth Anniversary Colloquium V*. New York, 1972. Two economists defend continued growth but show how to recalculate the Gross National Product to take better account of true welfare.

UPI Compix

UNIT THREE:

AMERICA IN THE WORLD

KEY CONCEPTS

Nationalism has been the dominant force in world politics since the eighteenth century. It is rooted in the concept that the nation-state, based on the common ethnic or cultural origins of a particular people, is the preferred form of governmental organization. American nationalism stems from a heritage of common political ideals rather than ethnic unity. According to nationalist doctrine, the interests of the nation-state take precedence over a sense of common identity with other peoples or with mankind as a whole, but in any case the independent action of each nation best serves the welfare of all. By contrast, *internationalism* advocates collective or cooperative action among nations for maximum mutual benefit.

Imperialism refers to a policy by which a state aims to extend its control, by force if necessary, over other territories and peoples. *Colonialism* involves acquiring and maintaining overseas dependencies for the benefit of the mother country. *Economic imperialism* aims at deriving trade benefits from the economic exploitation of weaker peoples without imposing political control. *Expansionism* refers to the tendency or desire of a nation to extend its interests beyond its existing territorial limits. It may take the form of economic expansion—extending trade or trying to control the resources of other areas—or of physical expansion—extending national control over new territory. American expansion was first directed at annexing new territories within the North American continent. In the late nineteenth century the focus shifted to economic imperialism and territorial expansion overseas, including the acquisition of quasi-colonial possessions.

Intervention is an action by one country intended to influence events in another. Interference in the affairs of another nation can involve political, economic, or military action ranging from clandestine operations aimed at affecting a country's internal political affairs, to providing economic assistance or imposing economic sanctions, to supplying war material, to actually sending military forces into a country or to its support. The United States has at one time or another intervened in these ways in other countries' affairs. During the period before the United States entered World War II, the term "interventionists" was used particularly to describe those who advocated support for Great Britain and the Allies.

Isolationism. Once the major element in American foreign policy, isolationism is based on the concept that the United States can and should remain entirely independent of political and military alliances with other nations. Formulated in Washington's "Farewell Address" in 1796, the policy remained dominant in our relations with other powers for over a

hundred years. Recently, a new isolationism has emerged that urges withdrawal from the United States' self-assumed role of world policeman.

Revolution implies fundamental or violent change. Revolutions can result in drastic changes in a country's political and social systems, as in the French and Russian Revolutions, or only in the transfer of power from one group to another with little effect on the existing system, as in the "palace" revolutions once common in Latin America. The American Revolution was largely, as Thomas Barrow argues, a colonial revolt, with political independence rather than social change the primary purpose and result.

National security means primarily protection against attack by another nation, but it also involves the concept of *internal security*, or the safety of our institutions from subversion from within by disaffected citizens. As Richard Hofstadter points out in his discussion of the "paranoid style" in politics, fear of conspiracy from outside and from within has characterized American attitudes toward national security.

"The Imperial Presidency" is a term used by historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. to describe the recent growth in power of the executive branch of the federal government at the expense of Congress and the courts, a growth achieved particularly through the President's conduct of foreign affairs. Threats to national security have been a common justification for the extension of presidential powers in domestic affairs as well.

ARTICLES AND READINGS

Michael E. Parrish

Most of the topics on the agenda of the American Issues Forum—immigration, work, the family, the political system—focus attention upon aspects of life *within* American society and how, as a nation, we have changed in the course of 200 years. Walter LaFeber discusses our relationships to other nations—what is usually called foreign policy—and, in so doing, he sheds additional light upon how Americans regard themselves as a society. Since the founding of our country, we have responded to the rest of the world on the basis of both concrete self-interest and a powerful image of who and what we were as a nation.

In his first article LaFeber argues that America's policy of avoiding entangling alliances with other nations was based on a careful estimation of self-interest. By following George Washington's policy of having "as little *political* connection as possible" with other nations, Americans would be free to develop and expand their commercial interests without becoming involved in the wars of Europe. America would grow in economic strength, maximizing profit, while Europeans slaughtered each other in their internecine conflicts. America retained her independence of action and did not enter world politics until the twentieth century when she thought she could dictate her own terms.

But is it not also possible to argue that our self-image as well as our self-interest was instrumental in shaping our policies toward other nations and determining the extent to which America would be "isolationist" or "internationalist"?

Our own self-image emphasized America's uniqueness as the first "new" nation, a country of republican virtue, democratic in spirit and institutions, liberated from the ancient scourge of kings, clerics, aristocrats, and fixed social rankings typical of European societies. The idea of America's exceptional position gave birth in turn to notions of superiority and of our special relationship to people everywhere as a model of enlightened social development.

On the one hand, a belief in America's uniqueness stimulated a powerful desire to transform other nations—indeed the entire world—in our own image. As early as 1774 an anonymous Bostonian expressed those sentiments in his "Song on Liberty":

> Some fitter day shall crown us masters of the Main,
> In giving laws and freedom to subject France and Spain;
> And all the isles o'er ocean spread shall tremble and obey,
> The Lords, the Lords, the Lords, the Lords of North America.

The Bostonian's ideas were in turn echoed by President Wilson more than 125 years later, when, at the time of the Mexican Revolution, he

remarked: "I shall teach the South Americans to elect good men." And still another half-century later, President Lyndon B. Johnson, explaining why he sent American troops into the Dominican Republic in 1965, argued that the people there wanted exactly what America wanted for them: "food and work and quiet in the night. . . . We want for the peoples of this hemisphere only what they want for themselves—liberty, justice, dignity, a better life for all." He failed to mention that many people in the Dominican Republic also wanted a social revolution—something that, as Senator J. William Fulbright notes in his critique of the intervention, Americans did not want and attempted to prevent.

America's tendency to intervene in world affairs, especially since the turn of the century, has grown in part out of a conviction that sooner or later all of humanity should evolve toward our ideal of the good society—representative government, civil liberties, private property, and social equality—rather than toward some other model of social organization. For example, Woodrow Wilson proclaimed that we should "make the world safe for democracy"—or, as one diplomatic historian has said, "make the world American for safety." The Truman Doctrine was similarly predicated on the assumption that democracy was the best form of government. Of course, Americans have also intervened in world affairs to protect their own specific economic and security interests; but often these interests have been equated with a democratic world.

At the same time that the belief in our uniqueness as a nation stimulated a desire to intervene in world affairs, however, it also generated a strong—and contradictory—desire among many Americans to remain aloof from a corrupt world. As LaFeber notes, the Founding Fathers' determination to separate themselves from the corrupt society of Britain was a major factor in their decision for independence. Other American leaders, too, have thought it desirable to pull up the drawbridges around the nation and to isolate it as much as possible from the maelstrom of international politics and intrigue. "Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled," John Quincy Adams said in 1821, "there will her [America's] heart, her benedictions, and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy."

If America ventured forth to transform the world, Adams continued, she would become trapped "in all the wars of interest and . . . individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom. . . . She might become the dictatress of the world. She should be no longer the ruler of her own spirit." America, according to Adams, could preserve her uniqueness only by remaining a passive model of social virtue.

These sentiments emerged again and again in our history among, for example, those Americans who opposed our annexation of a colonial empire in 1898; among those who, like Senator William E. Borah, resisted our attachment to the League of Nations after World War I; and among those who protested against military intervention in Vietnam.

Thus it would appear that both "isolationism" and "internationalism" sprang from similar psychological roots: a belief in American uniqueness and superiority vis-a-vis other nations.

Very few American leaders in the eighteenth, nineteenth, or twentieth centuries, as LaFeber notes, advocated that we cut ourselves off entirely from the rest of the world. Political entanglements were one thing, commercial involvement another. Beginning in the colonial period, Americans reached out to establish and enlarge their economic ties with other nations. Isolationism, expressed in Washington's "Farewell Address" or Senator Borah's attack on the League of Nations, usually meant retaining our freedom to act alone without obligations or responsibilities to other nations.

This particular style of isolationism, therefore, could become extremely nationalistic and chauvinistic. It was certainly not incompatible with American expansionism. "Can you hope for peace when love of country is disregarded in your scheme," Borah asked during debate over the League of Nations, "when the spirit of nationality is rejected, even scoffed at?" By entering the League, he argued, America would sacrifice her nationality on the altar of collective security; she would lose all freedom to respond in world politics as she saw fit.

As practiced in America during the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, LaFeber notes, isolationism did not lead to pacifism or the absence of conflict. The diplomatic historian Thomas Bailey documents many of the episodes of violence and conquest that took place during that period when Americans literally destroyed scores of Indian nations, seized millions of acres from Mexico, and came to exercise significant control over the other societies in the Western Hemisphere under the Monroe Doctrine and its later variants. America may not have entered a formal treaty of alliance with any nation, but this did not prevent her farmers and businessmen from extending the range of their trade throughout the world. Nor did it prevent the invasion of other countries by soldiers from the United States.

It would appear that Washington had been mistaken. Commercial and political ties could not always be neatly segregated. The steady expansion of America's commercial interests in Latin America, Asia, and Europe brought in their wake many political entanglements and rivalries with other nations. Those Americans who invested in Mexican copper mines, Cuban sugar plantations, or Chinese railroads became anxious about internal affairs in those lands, and they expected their government in Washington to become concerned, too.

Between the 1880s and 1914, America skirmished many times with other European nations over economic concessions in the under-developed regions of the world. And with increasing frequency, we intervened with military force to restore "law and order"—in Cuba, Haiti, Santo Domingo, Panama, Nicaragua, Mexico, the Philippines, and China.

It can be argued that America's final conversion to internationalism

during the twentieth century (especially after World War II) did not require a fundamental shift in the pattern of her behavior with other nations. The number and scope of her formal alliances grew enormously; she became a member of the United Nations but at the same time continued to intervene unilaterally in the affairs of other societies: Greece, Lebanon, Cuba, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and Cambodia.

The reasons behind America's conversion to professed internationalism are many and complex, but through LaFeber's articles and the Reader selections we can distinguish the two most important factors. Above all, America's rise to "great power" status was, as Bailey argues, a cumulative process, extending over a century and tied directly to her increasing economic and technological supremacy among the major industrial powers. To have remained neutral during either World War I or II, America would have been forced to abandon a large portion of her world trade and drastically modify her own internal economic system.

Finally, the complete breakdown of the old European colonial empires after World War II left enormous power vacuums in many regions of the world—Africa, the Middle East, and Asia—vacuums that the United States attempted to fill in order to prevent the success of local revolutionary movements and the expansion of Soviet or Chinese communist influence. After 1945 America attempted to create an international sphere of influence, based upon military and economic aid, to match her old hemispheric one. But the economic and moral burdens of this new self-assigned responsibility undermined her domestic stability.

The billions of dollars in American aid that poured forth each year into foreign nations eroded both our own monetary system and that of our principal allies as well. Meanwhile, as LaFeber writes, "our influence began to dwindle in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Western Europe." Vietnam became the ultimate debacle because it sapped our economic system through war-induced inflation, and, as LaFeber points out in his fourth article, brought the country to the brink of what many viewed as a presidential dictatorship. In the wake of our Vietnam defeat, America has not repudiated her post-1945 alliances or retreated from the world at large, but her international pretensions have received a decisive setback. At the same time, it should be noted, she has entered into a new period of détente with the Soviets and the Chinese that promises to reduce further the old tensions of the cold war period.

Contrary to the fears expressed by many national leaders at the time of our evacuation from Vietnam, it does not appear likely that we will return to an isolationist posture in the near future, but Robert Tucker's analysis of the new isolationism should make us reflect upon the extent to which a reduced American role in the world remains a viable possibility. Neither our military security nor our economic vitality, he argues, depends upon the extensive network of alliances, aid programs, and military interventions that characterized American foreign policy since 1945.

Insecurity

What in fact is the essence of national security? Does it reside in the size of a nation's military force? Its economic strength? Its freedom from aggressive neighbors? Why in the past have Americans felt insecure about their position in the world and about their own internal state of social cohesion? How has the one influenced the other?

Throughout most of her history, America has enjoyed the blessings of physical security granted to few nations. With the exception of the Revolution and the second war with England in 1812, foreign troops have not marched on American soil. Two oceans and two militarily weak neighbors gave the United States the luxury of security without a bloated military establishment throughout the nineteenth and half of the twentieth centuries. During both world wars, moreover, America's civilian population escaped the physical devastation visited upon inhabitants in England, France, Russia, Germany, and Japan. Boston residents did not whiff poison gas; bombs did not fall on New York City. With the exception of the American South at the time of the Civil War, American civilians have not known military defeat and military occupation.

In the period after World War II, America not only continued to enjoy physical security, but she also held a decisive military and economic advantage over other nations. Yet throughout this long expanse of history, Americans have frequently behaved as though their nation were on the brink of disintegration and collapse from the evil designs of both foreigners and disloyal Americans.

America, LaFeber points out, has faced real dangers from abroad and within, yet the response to these dangers has often been wholly disproportionate to the threat. What the late historian Richard Hofstadter calls "the paranoid style" has been all too characteristic of American behavior during periods of both domestic and foreign tension. Unable or unwilling to see social change as a complex process involving many factors, Americans have sought easy explanations for the tensions within their own society or their relationships with other nations by attributing extraordinary influence to malevolent persons, groups, or institutions.

Revolutions, for example, are extraordinarily complex events, involving a unique constellation of social conditions and institutional arrangements in particular countries that have evolved over hundreds of years. But Americans, typically, have sought to understand revolutions in terms of the actions of a few willful conspirators—Bolsheviks, Castroites, Vietcong—who suddenly seize power and throw a society off its "normal" course of evolution. In much the same way, Hofstadter notes, it has been possible for Americans to single out specific groups—labor agitators, Wall Street bankers, Roman Catholics, Jews, slaveowners—as the principal cause of social unrest and conflict.

Americans seldom expect consensus or unanimity in their domestic affairs. At the same time, they have frequently insisted upon the necessity for consensus in foreign policy when the nation negotiates or makes war

with other nations. And when that consensus has not materialized, the dissenters have often been subjected to severe repression and ostracism on the theory that their actions give aid and comfort to America's rivals. Those Americans who urged a different course of action vis-a-vis France in the 1790s, Mexico in the 1840s, Russia in the 1940s, or Vietnam in the 1960s were all looked upon as sources of weakness and insecurity within our society at the time.

In this century, McCarthyism became our most extreme form of collective insecurity and of the "paranoid style" in politics. America and the rest of the world faced severe, multiple crises following 1945—physical devastation, hunger, falling colonial empires, social revolutions—but few of them could be solved through some magic act of American will power alone. All of our massed financial, industrial, and military power could not radically change the course of developments in China, for example, or stop the Soviet Union from dominating Eastern Europe in much the same way as we dominated the Caribbean.

However, when the world failed to respond to our pressure and desires, people like McCarthy had a simple explanation: traitors within America were responsible. The great folly and tragedy of McCarthyism was that it shifted attention away from America's genuine problems abroad onto illusory ones of treason and betrayal at home. In so doing, it deeply divided American society, played havoc with institutions such as the Army and the State Department, and made it even more unlikely that America could deal rationally with the many-sided problems besetting the world community.

Those problems have reached a new magnitude today, as the diplomat Charles Yost points out in his article, "The Insecurity of Nations." The manifold crises of humankind—overpopulation, famine, nuclear holocaust—cannot be attributed to the willful acts of a band of conspirators. Their solution demands a new internationalism.

Americans as Anti-Revolutionaries

The year 1976 marks the 200th birthday of America's Revolution. Yet, as LaFeber writes in his third article, we have become a very unrevolutionary people in the years since 1776, especially from the perspective of other revolutionaries who have looked to us for aid, comfort, or inspiration. Has the nature of our revolution been misinterpreted? Not entirely. As both LaFeber and the historian Thomas Barrow point out, our struggle against England was fundamentally an anti-colonial war, an effort to break the chain of economic and political dependence that bound our seaboard communities to London and the British Empire. This aspect of our revolution has been well understood by other societies who sought to throw off their colonial status in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Latin Americans who rebelled against Spain invoked the spirit of our revolution; so, too, did the Vietnamese revolutionary Ho Chi Minh, who modelled his country's declaration of independence upon Mr. Jefferson's.

But despite this similarity between the United States and Vietnam in expressed ideology, the two countries were worlds apart in their revolutionary experience, as reporter Frances FitzGerald writes in *Fire in the Lake*, excerpted in the Reader. America's failure to understand the uniqueness of each country's revolution surely contributed to the failure of United States policy in Southeast Asia.

Many modern revolutions—in China, Cuba, Vietnam, and the African nations—have been to some extent anti-colonial revolutions in which the local revolutionaries have been required to overturn an old ruling elite within their own country as well as to cut the ties of economic influence that bind the elite to other nations.

In other crucial respects, of course, our revolution was very different from those that came later. As Barrow and Senator Fulbright point out, no radical redistribution of power, status, and property took place as a consequence of what happened in America between 1776 and 1787. Our revolution did not recreate a social order; it confirmed the existence of the old one, rooted in substantial equality and broad participation in the political process. The Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville, as early as the 1830s, noted the middle-class orientation of our revolution and the tendency of Americans to resist social movements that involved drastic upheavals in property or class relationships.

America's opposition to most twentieth-century revolutions rests upon another basic fact. As LaFeber points out, the poor seaboard community that rebelled against Great Britain in the 1770s became a major industrial and financial power by the end of the nineteenth century, with a substantial interest in maintaining the world status quo. When America joined the exclusive club of the imperial powers, she could hardly be expected to sympathize with the revolutions in the underdeveloped areas of the world that jeopardized her own long-term economic and strategic interests. Long before President Eisenhower spoke of the "falling domino" principle of revolution in the case of Vietnam, other American leaders had acted on the theory that a successful revolution could begin a chain reaction against the status quo. Without military aid to Greece, President Truman warned in 1947, communism would spread across the entire Mediterranean. Castro's triumph in Cuba stimulated American efforts to overthrow his regime and to oppose even liberal regimes in the Caribbean on the grounds that they might become seed beds of future revolutions.

As President Johnson said in his speech on the Dominican intervention, which later became known as the Johnson Doctrine, "The American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere."

Presidents and Foreign Policy

"The management of foreign relations appears to be the most susceptible of abuse of all the trusts committed to government," James Madison told the members of the Constitutional Convention. Although Congress has

retained the power to declare war and to appropriate all funds for the operation of the military forces, the initiative in foreign affairs clearly rests with the President. The abuses that have taken place in the management of foreign relations are a combination of overweening presidential ambitions and congressional apathy.

The "imperial presidency" is not wholly a creature of the post-1945 period of American internationalism. During the nineteenth century, too, American Presidents frequently presented Congress with a *fait accompli* in foreign policy. Jefferson, a trenchant critic of executive power before entering the White House, carried out the decisive negotiations for Louisiana without consulting Congress. On other occasions Presidents undermined the legislature's war-making authority. Polk's military maneuvers in Texas, for example, as Abraham Lincoln argued in his speech before the House of Representatives, left both the Mexicans and the American Congress with little choice but to fight. A war against Spain for Cuban independence in 1898 became, by virtue of the initiatives taken by McKinley and his subordinates, a war to strip Spain of all her important colonies, including Puerto Rico and the Philippines.

In his study of Franklin Roosevelt's policy, Robert Divine shows the difficulties FDR faced when attempting both to keep America out of war and to protect the country's national interests. At times he walked the fine line between legality and illegality, kept his motives hidden from Congress and the public, and moved the country nearer and nearer to armed struggle with Germany while professing a desire to remain a nonbelligerent. In retrospect, many of FDR's policies (destroyers-for-bases and submarine reconnaissance) seem justified in view of the isolationist mood of the Congress and the barbaric nature of Nazism. But these circuitous methods, as LaFeber points out, served as precedents for FDR's successors, including Truman, Johnson, and Nixon, who twisted presidential power into forms the Founding Fathers would not have recognized.

Even in the wake of Vietnam and a reduction of old cold war anxieties, LaFeber concludes, it will not be easy to rein in the power of the President in the area of foreign policy. The need for quick and decisive executive action in the face of a military threat was recognized at the time of the nation's founding, and the proper scope of presidential power was debated in the Constitutional Convention. The issue remains controversial today, as indicated by the Senate debate on the War Powers Act. Despite the adoption of that act in 1973, requiring the President to seek congressional approval before using military force beyond a brief emergency period, President Gerald Ford dispatched military force to Cambodia during the Mayaguez incident with only a few perfunctory telephone calls to legislative leaders. In a world of nuclear weapons and instant annihilation, somebody's finger must be on the trigger of defense, but at the same time the President retains the power to commit American forces in such a manner as to take from the Congress the power to decide life or death for all the rest of us.

STUDY QUESTIONS

1. What factors made America's traditional policy of isolation from "entangling alliances" possible? What factors brought about its abandonment?

Suggested Guidelines

First consider Washington's "Farewell Address" and the background to it LaFeber describes. Note what the Founding Fathers meant by "entangling alliances." How did they hope to encourage commercial links abroad while avoiding permanent political and military ties? Why was this objective more realistic in 1796 than in 1778, when we made the treaty with France? Note that the physical isolation Washington called "our detached and distant situation" enabled the early Republic to follow his advice and that we did "remain one People." Consider too Thomas Bailey's assessment of American strength in 1776 in terms of territory, population, natural resources, maritime power, and leadership and his listing of other advantages we enjoyed such as weak neighbors and Europe's preoccupation with its own continental power conflicts. Note also that our own westward expansion increased our strength dramatically so that, as Bailey observes, by the end of the Civil War we were a "great power," capable of dominating the Western Hemisphere and further extending and defending our international economic interests.

What factors led to the war with Spain in 1898, our acquisition of overseas possessions, and our involvement in World War I? Consider Senator Borah's arguments against the League of Nations. Why did this kind of isolationist sentiment remain strong in the inter-war years? Consult Robert Divine's article regarding the reasons Roosevelt gave for abandoning neutrality in World War II. Why did we join the United Nations? What changed conditions and attitudes did the Truman Doctrine, Eisenhower's "domino" theory, the Johnson Doctrine, and our involvement in Vietnam reflect? Finally, consider Robert Tucker's analysis of the premises on which our post-war alliances and strategies were based. Why does he believe they no longer hold true? Why does LaFeber argue that we must now become "true internationalists"?

2. Describe the kinds of threats that have made insecurity a continuing factor in American history.

Suggested Guidelines

First use LaFeber's second article as your framework in answering this question and consult Reader articles for examples of the threats he describes. Begin by asking how the crises of the early Republic differed from those between 1815 and 1865. Why did the threat of class warfare and social revolution emerge in the post-Civil War decades? In what other periods did economic depression contribute most to American insecurity?

Has there ever been a generation of Americans that did not experience the threat or reality of war? What new anxieties did nuclear technology bring? Why did the fear of communist subversion Richard Hofstadter describes dominate the 1950s? What other examples of that kind of perceived threat does Hofstadter give? How do other Reader selections illustrate our fears of communist aggression since World War II?

Consult LaFeber's last two articles as well. What crises contributed to insecurity in the last fifteen years? Why was President Ford's 1975 annual message so gloomy? What examples of threats all peoples face today does Charles Yost give? Finally, do Americans still feel insecurity more deeply because of the "burden of righteousness" LaFeber attributes to our Puritan heritage?

3. Given our own revolutionary experience, what accounts for Americans' hostility to revolutions abroad and our disinterest in further revolution at home?

Suggested Guidelines

Consider first the character of the American Revolution as described by LaFeber and Thomas Barrow. Why was it more an anti-colonial war than a social revolution? Why did Tocqueville believe Americans' "equality of condition" made them "dread revolutions"? When severe economic depressions in America did threaten class warfare, how did we forestall social revolution at home? In Tocqueville's day and later, what role did Americans' business interests play in discouraging revolution at home and opposing it abroad? If we saw our Revolution as a model for all mankind, why were we unsympathetic to other colonial wars for independence such as the Latin American rebellions against Spanish rule? Why were revolutions in Texas, Florida, and California more acceptable? How did Lincoln's view of the right to revolt affect his position on the Texas question?

How does LaFeber explain Americans' increasing hostility to foreign revolutions in the twentieth century? Why were communist revolutions and any revolutions in the Western Hemisphere especially feared? Consider here Woodrow Wilson's policies, the Truman Doctrine's effect on communist-inspired revolutionary movements in Europe, our involvement in Korea and Vietnam, and our defense of the "status quo" in Latin America. Compare Lyndon Johnson's justification of his intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 to William Fulbright's criticism of it. Why did Fulbright believe we were becoming the "most unrevolutionary nation on earth"? How does Frances FitzGerald explain the failure of our policy in Vietnam? Has the Vietnam experience undermined our belief that American democracy is the only acceptable "model for all mankind," or will the American people continue to support anti-revolutionary policies like the CIA intervention in Chile? Finally, does Tocqueville's analysis of the social factors shaping Americans' attitudes toward revolution still hold true today?

4. What is the American President's proper role in foreign affairs?

Suggested Guidelines

Here you will need to make a value judgment. Assess the arguments LaFeber offers condemning the misuse of presidential power in foreign affairs at the expense of Congress and his contention that such misuse leads to similar ill effects in the sphere of domestic affairs. How do Reader selections support or refute his position?

Consider first LaFeber's description of what the Constitution's framers intended the executive's role in foreign policy to be, and consult the excerpt from the Constitutional Convention debate on the war powers issue. Were recent presidential practices, as Senator Javits argued, an "aberration from the original intent and spirit of the Constitution"? Did Presidents Polk, Roosevelt, Truman, Johnson, and Nixon equally abuse the war-making power? Why did Congress increasingly abdicate its responsibility in foreign affairs in this century? What role did modern technological developments play in this process? Do you believe foreign policy has become so complex and dangerous that only the President can act intelligently and swiftly enough to defend our interests? Why did Congress seek to restore its position in the War Powers Act in 1973? In your opinion, were the arguments of Senator Goldwater or the arguments of Senator Javits on that bill more convincing? Do you believe passage of the Act unduly limited the President's options for action? Finally, considering the evidence with which he supports it, do you agree with LaFeber's contention that presidential power must be checked in both foreign and domestic affairs?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Walter LaFeber

Article 10: "We Shall Run the World's Business": Americans as Isolationists

Bailey, Thomas A. "America's Emergence as a World Power: The Myth and the Verity," *Pacific Historical Review* (1961), pp. 1-16. Excellent survey of America's rise to super-power status since 1776. Bailey argues that the United States was a world power at its birth.

Barnet, Richard. *Roots of War*. New York, 1972. Fine discussion of the motivation of American foreign policy in post-1945 era, placing supposed isolationism of pre-1945 alongside strikingly similar cold war attitudes.

Bell, Coral. *Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power*. New York, 1963. Analysis of how United States policy-makers hoped to dictate, rather than negotiate, a settlement in the cold war between 1949 and the mid-1950s.

Cole, Wayne S. *Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II*. New York, 1974. First-rate, highly readable study of the struggle between isolationists and the Roosevelt administration just before World War II.

Feis, Herbert. *The Diplomacy of the Dollar, 1919-1932*. Baltimore, 1950. Good short essay that demonstrates how "internationalist" American economic diplomacy became during the 1920s.

Gardner, Lloyd, *et. al. Creation of the American Empire*. Chicago, 1973, 1975. The authors argue throughout that isolationism was never complete in American history. See Chapter II especially for key debate over alliances during the American Revolution.

Gilbert, Felix. *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy*. Princeton, N.J., 1961. This is the best study of the debate over whether to ally with Europe in the eighteenth century.

Tucker, Robert. *A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise*. New York, 1972. Provocative argument that the United States should become more isolationist in the 1970s.

Article 11: Insecurity: An American Tradition

Aaron, Daniel (ed.). *America in Crisis: Fourteen Crucial Episodes in American History*. New York, 1952. Specialists who write well examine the crisis points throughout American history, ranging from labor strikes to the emergence of twentieth-century art to witch trials.

Flexner, James T. *George Washington: Anguish and Farewell, 1793-1799.* Boston, 1972. Most recent prize-winning work about the decade when the new Constitution almost collapsed.

Channing, Steven A. *Crisis of Fear: Secession in South Carolina.* New York, 1970. Best case study of how the key southern state moved toward the Civil War and why.

Davis, David B. *The Slave Power Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style.* Baton Rouge, La., 1969. A subtle essay demonstrating how fear permeated and motivated both North and South before the Civil War.

Davis, David B. "Stress-Seeking and the Self-Made Man in American Literature," in Samuel K. Klausner (ed.), *Why Man Takes Chances.* New York, 1968. Provocative analysis showing that American individualism can be viewed partly in terms of stress and personal crisis.

Hofstadter, Richard. "Reflections on Violence in the United States," in *American Violence: A Documentary History.* New York, 1971. An innovative essay (together with analyses of major outbreaks of violence during 300 years of American history) by one of the great American historians.

Kenyon, Cecelia. "Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government," *William and Mary Quarterly* (1955), pp. 3-43. A brilliant if complex explanation of why large numbers of Americans feared the new Constitution of 1787.

Neibuhr, Reinhold. *The Irony of American History.* New York, 1952. A classic account by the most influential American theologian and philosopher of the post-1940 era. Neibuhr argues that the United States necessarily becomes less secure as it becomes more powerful.

Taylor, George Rogers. "Agrarian Discontent in the Mississippi Valley Preceding the War of 1812," *Journal of Political Economy* (1931), pp. 471-505. An explanation of how economic and social crisis in the West helped cause the second war with England.

Ward, John William. "The Meaning of Lindbergh's Flight," *American Quarterly* (1958), pp. 3-16. One of the most important and influential writings on the inter-war years, pointing out that Americans glorified Lindbergh because he seemed to resolve the tension between their revered individualism and the new mechanized world that threatened to crush individualism.

Wood, Gordon. *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787.* Chapel Hill, N.C., 1969. The indispensable work for understanding the sense of crisis that moved the Founding Fathers toward the Constitutional Convention.

Article 12: Americans as Anti-Revolutionaries

Barnet, Richard. *Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World.* New York, 1968. The best overview of the post-1945 American attitude toward revolution; told by a former official in the Kennedy administration.

Draper, Theodore. *Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities.* New York, 1962. Detailed argument that Castro, not the United States, betrayed the Cuban Revolution.

Levin, N. Gordon, Jr. *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics.* New York, 1968. A good survey of how Americans miscalculated when they confronted the first great twentieth-century revolutions in Mexico, China, and particularly Russia.

Levinson, Jerome and Juan de Onís. *The Alliance That Lost its Way.* Chicago, 1970. The best and most detailed account of why the Kennedy-Johnson administrations failed to remove the causes of revolution in Latin America.

FitzGerald, Frances. *Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam.* Boston, 1972. A prize-winning, splendidly told story of why the United States never had a chance to contain the revolution in Southeast Asia.

Paludan, Phillip S. "The American Civil War Considered as a Crisis in Law and Order," *American Historical Review* (1972), pp. 1013-1035. Suggestive analysis of how state-building and participation in new governments between 1800 and 1860 led northerners to oppose civil war and political chaos in 1861.

Pressly, Thomas J. "Bullets and Ballots: Lincoln and the 'Right of Revolution,'" *American Historical Review* (1962), pp. 647-662. Pioneering attempt to demonstrate how Lincoln tried to reconcile the principles of 1776 with the North's opposition to the South's principles of 1861.

Williams, William Appleman. *The U.S., Cuba, and Castro.* New York, 1962. Placing the Castro revolution in historical perspective, Williams argues that the United States caused then tried to undermine that upheaval.

Williams, William Appleman. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.* New York, 1962. Most influential account of why Americans oppose twentieth-century revolution.

Article 13: Presidents, Foreign Policy, and the Only Law of History.

Blum, John. *The Republican Roosevelt*. New York, 1954. A good short study of how the first "modern" President developed and used his powers. Highly readable.

Cohen, Bernard. *The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy*. New York, 1973. The best book on why policy-makers believe mass public opinion is of little importance. Conclusions buttressed by personal interviews of policy-makers during the 1965-1966 Vietnam involvement.

Freeland, Richard M. *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*. New York, 1972. Highly provocative and innovative work that argues that the Truman administration manipulated the anti-communist issue at home in order to create a consensus for cold war policies overseas.

Gardner, Lloyd. *Architects of Illusion*. Chicago, 1970. Splendid study of executive policy-makers at the start of the cold war; see especially "Dean Acheson and the 'Holy Pretense.' "

Graber, Doris. *Public Opinion, the President, and Foreign Policy*. New York, 1968. Four good case studies (Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe) on presidential leadership at the beginning of the Republic.

Hirschfield, Robert S. (ed.). *The Power of the Presidency: Concepts and Controversy* (2nd ed.). Chicago, 1973. Superb book of readings, including original documents and essays by respected authorities.

Neustadt, Richard. *Presidential Power*. New York, 1960. This is the book that was to serve as a text for increasing presidential power in the 1960s. Unfortunately, it did.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. *The Imperial Presidency*. Boston, 1973. The first 200 pages are a first-rate survey of how presidential power developed from 1787 to the mid-1960s. The last 200 pages are an impassioned attack upon the "revolutionary" Nixon presidency.

Williams, William Appleman. *Some Presidents from Wilson to Nixon*. New York, 1972. Revisionist essays, with those on Hoover and Eisenhower especially provocative.

Wills, Garry. *Nixon Agonistes*. Boston, 1970. Still the best book for understanding Nixon, Wills brilliantly interweaves post-1913 American liberal beliefs with the growth of presidential power and social problems in the 1950s and 1960s.

UNIT FOUR:

GROWING UP AND PURSUING HAPPINESS IN AMERICA

KEY CONCEPTS

Socialization is the process by which individuals become adapted to the behavioral patterns and standards of their society. The family and the church were the primary socializing institutions in early America. In the nineteenth century the public school assumed a major role. Today Americans still expect the school to perform socializing functions that the family, the churches, and other institutions are no longer willing or able to provide, but in Harris' view the "mass media" (television, radio, recordings, newspapers, and magazines) are now the central agents of socialization in our society.

An **"established" religion** is an official religion, sanctioned and supported by government. Although toleration of a variety of religions developed in some of the American colonies, certain religious groups, such as the Congregational Church in New England and the Church of England in Virginia, enjoyed the special privileges "establishment" involved: attendance at the official church was usually compulsory, only its members could hold public office, and it received tax support. By the Revolution some of these privileges had been considerably modified, and new state constitutions "disestablished" official churches, but, as Harris notes, vestiges of government support for privileged churches remained for some decades. The United States Constitution guarantees religious freedom, but complete separation of church and state in America remains controversial, as opposition to the Supreme Court's 1960s rulings outlawing prayer in public schools indicates.

Revivalism has been a recurring feature of American Protestant religious life since the 1740s. Organized attempts to revive religious concern and commitment, particularly through appeals to the emotions, began on the frontier and spread from the Presbyterians to other Protestant denominations, as Bernard Weisberger relates in his Reader article. Although it served social and emotional needs as well, revivalism's main attraction lay in its emphasis on individual religious experience rather than on doctrine and in the democratic participation it encouraged. Revivalism significantly shaped Protestant theology, hastening the abandonment of strict Calvinist doctrines, and became the primary tool for maintaining religious interest in an increasingly secular society.

Alternate family styles. The authoritarian patriarchal family described by Benjamin Wadsworth, which was once the only acceptable living unit in America, was modified in the nineteenth century under democratic and individualistic pressures, but today the institution of marriage itself is under significant challenge. The traditional family survives, but with new

attitudes toward sex roles, the increased participation of women in the work force, and the thrust toward equal rights for all individuals, alternate life styles are emerging. As Harris observes, various communal living experiments, companionate marriages involving truly equal partnership, and homosexual arrangements are becoming increasingly accepted.

Educational reform. The first major reform in the American educational process was the substitution of free public schools for family and private instruction. Through the work of reformers like Horace Mann in the nineteenth century, public schools staffed by trained instructors broadly extended formal education opportunities, and the public school became the primary socializing institution for all Americans, particularly for immigrants. In this century John Dewey and others challenged the relevance of traditional schooling, advocating **progressive education**, in which training in real life skills and situations replaced rote learning, and cooperation rather than competition was stressed. Some critics now advocate alternative public schools to provide a variety of choice in educational approaches, while others argue for voucher systems through which private education would be funded for those who prefer it to what the public schools offer.

Culture. Although the word has a broader meaning for anthropologists, in common usage culture is the pattern and products of a people's artistic and intellectual activity. The word originally referred only to the "fine arts," such as formalized sculpture, painting, and architecture, and "serious" music, dance, drama, and literature. However, the rise of democratic concepts of culture that accompanied political democracy led critics to call these activities *"high culture"* in order to distinguish them from the practical arts and crafts, folk art, and popular music and literature, which they called *"popular culture."*

In this century the democratization of taste has been carried to new heights, or depths, depending on one's viewpoint, by the development of modern communications media. Harris argues that we must consider the social consequences of "Masscult" or "Midcult," to use Dwight Macdonald's derisive terms, for the captive consumer whose tastes are shaped by the media.

Individualism. The belief that each person's needs, rights, and independence of thought and action are of primary importance has been a central tenet of American democratic thought. Nurtured by the opportunities provided by a new continent, individualism shaped attitudes toward personal responsibility that were often in conflict with the claims of society for conformity or collective action. Individualism weakened the development of a sense of community or common purpose, although its defenders

argued that, like laissez faire economics, it best served the interests of society as a whole. With the emergence of industrial society, Americans were forced to surrender much of the personal sovereignty they once enjoyed, and today modern technological developments further threaten the individual's right to privacy.

Inner-directed is the term sociologist David Riesman uses to describe the individual whose source of direction was internal, that is, his values were implanted by elders and other authorities early in life, and the individual internalized them or adopted them as his own. Such an individual tended to be morally self-sufficient, driven toward his goals by these internal values and principles. This character type, according to Riesman, was prevalent from the period of the Renaissance and Reformation until the mid-twentieth century, a period marked by physical, economic, and technological expansion. **Other-directed** is Riesman's term for the character type that is becoming prevalent in modern society, particularly in the upper-middle classes, in an age of consumption. The source of direction for the other-directed individual is his contemporaries, known to him directly or indirectly through the mass media. The goals of the other-directed individual are guided by others, on whom he depends for his moral values and sense of self. Both "inner-directed" and "other-directed" apply to ideal character types rather than to actual individuals.

ARTICLES AND READINGS

Jane L. Scheiber

Diversity has been the essential characteristic of the American nation from its beginning—a nation of many peoples, with different languages, religions, and customs. From the very start, however, certain institutions helped mold the society and shape its values. Neil Harris looks at some of these institutions—the family, the church, and the schools—in his first two articles. In his last two articles he examines the culture that emerged in America and one of the values most cherished by Americans—individualism.

The Family

"Throughout two hundred years of their nation's history," Harris writes in his first article, "most Americans defined their social location most readily as members of a family or church." Particularly in the colonial period, when many other institutions were still weak or were lacking altogether, the family bore the primary responsibility for preserving social order. The family was, as Harris points out, a model of the larger, hierarchical society; the father's authority over his family was unquestioned. In addition, the family bore the major responsibility for the education of children.

Benjamin Wadsworth's description in "A Well-Ordered Family" gives us a clear picture of the ideal colonial family. The father was the head of the household: "it belongs to the head to rule and govern." But although his power was absolute, he was urged to use love and kindness to win the obedience of his family. Husbands and wives were reminded that it was their duty to love each other. Parents were responsible for seeing that their children were not idle but were "brought up diligently in such business as they are capable of." In addition, they were to instruct their children in religion as well as in manners. Children, for their part, were to both love and fear their parents, to be faithful and obedient, and to support them in their old age.

How closely did the family approximate this ideal? Harris notes that "the new land strained familial unity and permanence from the beginning." Children often adapted more readily than their immigrant parents to the conditions of the New World. In addition, the abundance of land was a constant lure for ambitious or restless young sons who were eager to leave the family and strike out on their own. This was in marked contrast to the Old World, where succeeding generations stayed on the family land, farming ever smaller parcels as fathers divided their estates among their sons. On the other hand, it might be noted that the primitive conditions confronting the young family moving westward together also strengthened the family unit, which had to rely exclusively on its own members for survival in the wilderness.

The strains upon the family unit, Harris points out, increased after the Revolution as doctrines of equality, individualism, and the right to personal pursuit of happiness challenged older notions of authoritarianism. The result was a democratization of the family. Nevertheless, as long as America remained a largely rural nation, the family was the basic unit of economic organization as well as of social organization; children as well as adults were employed on the family farm or in household manufacture.

Increasing urbanization and industrialization in the second half of the nineteenth century changed this economic organization and inevitably had a profound effect on family patterns. The factory system meant that not only men, but women and children as well, were employed outside the home. (See Unit One, "Working in America.") For the first time, women in substantial numbers were able to find employment in occupations other than domestic services. This provided many women with new economic independence and was undoubtedly one factor accounting for the increasing divorce rate that Harris notes.

Urbanization was also accompanied by a growth in public schools, which, as we shall see, relieved the family of one of the main responsibilities it had borne in colonial times. The schools became the primary institution for Americanizing immigrant children, and immigrants were especially subject to family strains as their children rejected the ways of the Old Country in favor of those of their new home. (This matter is more fully discussed in Volume I of the reader, pp. 83-87.)

Industrialization also created a new class of wealthy townsmen, and the preoccupation with materialism and ostentation was so marked in the years following the Civil War that the period has been called "the Gilded Age." Booth Tarkington's Amberson family, preoccupied with fashions and comfort, clearly reflected the new values of an increasingly affluent society. At the same time, the role of the family in shaping those values seemed to be dwindling.

As Harris notes, despite the various strains on the family—reflected in a divorce rate that increased more than twenty-fold between 1890 and 1971—until recently, few questioned the value placed on marriage itself as an important institution. In fact, following the years of upheaval of the Great Depression and World War II, there was an increasing emphasis on family life as the basic source of happiness. Women in particular were supposed to find satisfaction in their roles as wives and mothers.

That this was not necessarily so became abundantly clear when Betty Friedan published *The Feminine Mystique* in 1963. Ten years later, looking back on those days when belief in the family as the source of personal fulfillment was an unquestioned tenet of faith, Friedan wrote in 1973, "However much we enjoyed being Junior and Janey's or Emily's mother, or B. J.'s wife, if we still had ambitions, ideas about ourselves as people in our own rights—well, we were simply freaks, neurotics, and we confessed our sin or neurosis to priest or psychoanalyst, and tried hard to adjust."

The growth of the women's movement and the achievement of major reforms that sought to end sex discrimination attest to the willingness of a large element of our society to reconsider the role that it has traditionally assigned to women and to recognize them as individuals quite apart from their positions as members of families.

What are the implications of the women's movement for the institution of the family? Obviously, as Friedan points out, if women are to achieve their goal of equality there must be some profound changes in our institutions, most notably in the provision of child care outside the home for working mothers. But are all aspects of the women's movement necessarily incompatible with the family as a basic social institution? One could argue that, in women's insistence on equality within the family as well as in society at large, we are witnessing another step in the democratization of the family that began more than 200 years ago.

Lately, however, there have been other attacks on the institution of the family. As Harris points out, "Experiments in communal living, companionate marriage, the attempt to legitimate homosexual unions—all are the outgrowth of new attitudes toward sexual expression and individual fulfillment which are no longer defined exclusively within the traditional family setting."

No doubt the women's movement helped to articulate and defend some of these new attitudes. But in part they can also be attributed to other factors, including the decline in the role of the church as the defender of traditional community values and morals.

The Church

In discussing the role of the church, Harris points out that "to a greater or less degree, the first settlements were created to support collective missionary dreams"—a fact also emphasized by Walter LaFeber in his discussion in Unit III of the causes of American insecurity. The Puritans of New England, especially, hoped to establish a Zion in the wilderness, recreating society according to God's law. And if not all the colonists matched the Puritans in religious zeal, religion was nevertheless one of the most important motives in the settlement of the colonies. Maryland was a haven for Roman Catholics, Pennsylvania for Quakers and other dissenters. (In the Spanish Southwest, too, friars battled for souls as the soldiers battled for the riches of the country, and the permanent Spanish settlements of that area were centered on the mission.) In all but four of the colonies—Rhode Island, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey—everyone was required to pay taxes to support the dominant church: Congregational in New England, Anglican in New York and in the South. Church attendance was also compulsory in many of the colonies.

But the status of the churches did not depend solely on their position as state-supported institutions. As Harris points out, the church was both the conscience and the interpreter of the community, establishing moral codes, preserving social order, articulating the sense of mission of

the people.

But the church, like the family, was bound to be affected by conditions in the New World. The centralized authority of the Anglican church, for instance, was difficult to maintain from England over the vast expanse of the Atlantic, and the ecclesiastical courts and membership in the legislature that gave the church such power in England were never duplicated in the New World. There was a clear need for settlers, regardless of faith, if the colonies were to survive. This need, combined with ideological convictions, tended to promote toleration in many of the colonies. By the eve of the American Revolution, there were, in addition to the Congregationalists and Anglicans, large numbers of Presbyterians, Baptists, Quakers, Dutch Reformed, Lutherans, Mennonites, a small number of Jews, and a host of minor sects.

The Great Awakening of the 1740s, the first of a series of religious revivals in America, had particular appeal for the less educated and privileged members of the American society; it further strengthened the nonestablished denominations and led to increasing opposition to tax support of some churches.

The Revolution, as Harris points out, "speeded the transformation of the church's role." The sense of mission was secularized, as political leaders and businessmen increasingly competed with ministers as spokesmen for the American dream. The Constitution of the new nation permanently separated church from state on the national level, and within a few decades even Massachusetts had withdrawn the last of the state privileges accorded the Congregational churches. America had become the first totally secular state in the modern world.

Having lost state support, "the churches fought to retain their influence by competing for souls in an age of evangelicalism," Harris writes. The evangelicalism that swept the country around 1800—the second Great Awakening—is described in the article on frontier religion by the historian Bernard Weisberger. The formal and aristocratic religions of the East had little appeal to the rugged individuals who were settling the western territory of the nation. Revivalism, with its emphasis on emotional faith rather than on doctrine, appealed to their democratic instincts and indeed reinforced them, as they believed, social distinctions had little meaning if any person could achieve salvation. Mass revivalism became a recurrent theme in American religion. The effect of revivalism was to further weaken the older, established churches of the East through schisms and competition for church membership. But, as Weisberger concludes, the churches had little alternative but to try to adapt themselves to the new conditions. "All of this cost something in religious depth, religious learning, religious dignity. Yet there was not much choice. The American churches lacked the support of an all-powerful state or of age-old traditions. They had to move with the times."

Increasingly, as Harris notes, churchmen in the nineteenth century turned to such social issues as abolition and temperance. Outspokenly

patriotic, these churchmen helped to assure that the churches did not lose their public function along with their public financial support.

But such a role was difficult to maintain. Dependent on the shifting moods of the majority, the churches often came to reflect rather than to shape community standards, while the multiplication of sects, as Harris points out, tended to divide rather than to unite the community. In the long run the churches, like the family, fell victim to the American emphasis on individual freedom and personal fulfillment, and the churches lost much of their authority.

The one notable exception to this pattern was the Catholic church. As Garry Wills points out in his article on a Catholic boyhood, the Catholic church for many years did *not* attempt to adapt to the changing times. On the contrary, the church represented stability, timelessness, changelessness; it maintained its faith through centuries-old rites and customs, reinforced through its own system of schools. Catholics, although of diverse national backgrounds, were thus set apart as a distinct group in America. It was only in the 1960s when Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI tried to update and modernize the doctrine and rituals of the church, to bring them abreast of a changing society, that the church began to lose its authority for many Catholic Americans.

Does this mean that churches—and God—are dead in America, as some have proclaimed? What is to be the role of the church in American society in the future? The theologian Harvey Cox addresses this problem in his article "Churches and the Future of Religion." "If God is dead or dying in the middle-class denominations," writes Cox, "he (or something that resembles him) is alive and well in at least two places": the conservative, evangelical churches and the Eastern mystical religions. It appears to Cox that we might be entering a third great awakening. But the mere revival of piety does not answer the more perplexing question of the proper role of the churches in modern society—a question that has divided churchmen themselves. Are the churches obligated to be today, as they were in the past, the moral conscience of the nation? What are their obligations in speaking out on such matters as the Vietnam bombings, presidential usurpation of power, injustice to minority groups? As Cox puts it, "Certainly the essential question is not: How shall the churches grow or how shall they endure? The question is: How can they be faithful?"

School and Community

If the family and the church experienced a loss of authority, what was to take their place in shaping the values of the society? To some extent it was the schools. As has been noted, in the early period of the nation's history, education was primarily the responsibility of the family, assisted by the church and private schools. Only in Massachusetts was there an early provision for public schools. As the 1647 law indicates, the primary concern was that all children be taught to read so that they could follow

the Scriptures and not succumb to "the old deluder, Satan." As Harris points out, "schooling had not yet become synonymous with education."

The American Revolution had an impact on education as it did on the family and the church. A republic needed a ruling class based on merit rather than on aristocracy, and education, according to Thomas Jefferson, Noah Webster, and others, was the best way to ferret out the talented. But, Harris notes, such arguments could not generate the necessary financial support for widespread public education.

In the nineteenth century the advocates of public education were more successful, although some of the arguments remained the same. Horace Mann, writing in the 1830s, stressed the importance of compulsory school attendance as a regulatory force that would contribute to the stability of society amidst the instability of republican institutions and passions. The educational reformers added to this the argument that the schools would also help children to adapt to society by promoting the skills that were necessary for economic independence. By the middle of the nineteenth century, they had won their cause except in the South, where tuition schools and private tutors were still prevalent.

But as Edward Eggleston's account in "The Hoosier School-Master" shows, schools, particularly in the rural areas, were often crude affairs and education, in the days before compulsory school attendance, was somewhat casual. The curriculum stressed the three R's, with some spelling, geography, and history occasionally added.

By the late nineteenth century, as Harris points out, educational reformers became increasingly critical of the schools, which did not seem to be filling the needs of society or of the individual. To the reformers, the schools appeared artificial; they relied on outmoded formal methods of education, and they did little to prepare their students for the realities of the new industrial order. The aims of the "progressives," led by John Dewey and others, as well as the fate of the progressive movement in education, are spelled out by Lawrence Cremin in his article on the transformation of the school. Essentially, the educational progressives, like the political progressives, were trying to improve the lives of the individual. This called for restructuring methods of education, making the schools a microcosm of the larger society, placing the individual at the center of the school's concern. Many of these reforms were achieved in the first half of the twentieth century, until a variety of factors—schism, the negative aspects of all movements that start as a protest *against* something, the difficulty of finding first-rate teachers who could cope with the methods of progressive education, the staleness of the ideas, and postwar conservatism—led to the decline of progressive education in the 1950s. Most importantly, Cremin concludes, the progressive education movement failed to keep pace with the continuing changes in society.

The progressive movement did not answer one of the basic questions regarding the role of the schools in our society: are they to be agents of social reform, insisting, for example, on individual rights and equality of

treatment, or are they merely to reflect the standards of the community and help children to adapt to the prevailing social circumstances? In Harris' view, this is one of the major dilemmas facing the schools today. Jonathan Kozol's narrative of his experience in the Boston public schools presents this dilemma in very personal terms. His view of the schools as an agency of social justice conflicted directly with that of the school administrators. The school's attitude cost him his job, but, in his view, it cost the children their spiritual and intellectual lives. The controversy and violence that have frequently surrounded forced integration of the schools is testimony to the fact that the schools have not always been able to solve the problems of the larger society.

Popular Culture

The essentially democratic nature of American society profoundly affected American culture from the beginning. In the early years of the Republic, Harris notes in his third article, American genius was drawn to politics rather than to the arts. European critics noted the paucity of a native American culture in the early nineteenth century and ridiculed the uncouthness of the society. But most Americans seemed satisfied with the grandeur of their technological progress and material prosperity; art would come later.

Harris notes that by the time of the Centennial, many Americans desired a national culture but thought it would come through an imitation of European models. Some, such as Henry James, regarded the absence of a cultural tradition as an advantage; it would allow Americans to choose what was best in other cultures, and the result would be a fusion that would surpass any other culture then in existence.

Others, however, argued that we should have a distinctively American culture, based on what was truly American—our technology, our climate, our people, and our government. While some critics berated Americans for failing to achieve a "high culture," by the 1920s, as Harris notes, other students of American society were defending folk-tales, handicrafts, engineering, and vaudeville as distinctively American forms of art. Rather than appealing to a small, highly cultured minority, these art forms belonged to the majority of the people.

Popular culture received an enormous impetus from the technological developments of the twentieth century: films, recordings, radio, and television—in short, the mass media. The people, rather than a handful of learned critics, became the arbiters of taste, as culture had to meet the test of the marketplace. The mass media, using the aggressive techniques of commercialism, soon became a dominant force in American culture. As Harris puts it, "Ironically, in several decades America has passed from a society whose culture was overshadowed by its political ideology, to a society almost culturally top-heavy, its forms of expression shaping rather than reflecting standards of conduct and belief. To a large extent film and television assumed the task of social integration so incompletely managed

by older institutions."

Granted the magnitude of the impact of the mass media on our culture, it remains to be asked whether this impact has been for good or for evil. From the point of view of the artist, as expressed by the poet Randall Jarrell in "Sad Heart at the Supermarket," the influence has been a baneful one. Jarrell sees the values of the mass culture as being in direct opposition to those timeless values of true or high culture. The artist in our society, he concludes, must either live apart from his society or sell himself out to the crude values of the popular, mass media culture.

On the other hand, the futurist and social commentator Alvin Toffler applauds the growth of the "culture consumer." He sees the popularization of art as consistent with the democratic view of life: in a democracy, art is for the masses, not for the elite. Nor, he argues, do all cultural standards have to be lowered as the number of culture consumers increases. Rather, there can be a gradual acquisition of taste for "high culture" by those who now follow "middle culture."

Finally, Harris notes that mass culture—the culture of the consumers—"relates to the larger character of American society—its colonial origins, its racial heterogeneity, its capitalistic ethos and rapid mobility."

Individualism

The technological advances that did so much to shape our popular culture also threatened one of the most cherished of American values: individualism.

The belief in individualism has been a basic tenet of the American creed throughout our history. Every person was entitled to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." America was the land of opportunity in which any citizen could rise according to his or her merits. Yet today that individualism—and the privacy that sustains it—are threatened by a variety of forces.

As Harris writes in his final article, "The threat to privacy does not come from any particular group or institution. It lies in the growth of mass society, in gigantic corporate enterprise, in congested cities and suburbs, mass production and bureaucracy, homogeneous communications media—nothing less than modernization itself."

Legally, as Harris points out, the rights of the individual are protected today as never before in our history. In actuality, however, the range of choices open to the individual has been narrowed in many areas. The economic individualism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has been replaced by government intervention in economic life—a point also emphasized by Paul Samuelson and the selections in Unit Two of the Reader.

The ability to retreat from the world in the manner of Henry David Thoreau, the nineteenth century philosopher who isolated himself from society on the shores of Walden Pond, has been greatly lessened in our

congested modern world. Even withdrawal into the privacy of one's family, home, or vacation retreat has been made more difficult by the ubiquitous telephone and other instruments of our technological society.

Another threat to individualism, Harris notes, comes from the growth and seeming permanence of our institutions. Once men and women could feel bigger than the institutions that served them; today, individuals—indeed whole generations—feel hemmed in by a sense that their fate is determined by institutions they can no longer control.

The generalization of danger—a general feeling of insecurity and unhappiness to which no specific cause can be assigned—has further diminished our sense of individualism, according to Harris.

The kind of individualism celebrated in the folklore of the West, the tall tales, seems a thing of the distant past. Davy Crockett, as the *Crockett Almanacs* testify, could fight the wilderness, Indians, wild animals, and two-legged "varmints"; he could provide for himself and his family on the edge of civilization. But how can the individual today fight unknown dangers, big government, computers?

Do the new conditions of society mean that individualism is no longer viable? According to sociologist David Riesman, the American of the mid-twentieth century is a very different character from the "inner-directed" American of an earlier era. The contemporary person no longer relies on himself and his own feelings as a guide to action; he no longer feels there are new frontiers to conquer. Rather, he feels a sense of helplessness in confronting the forces of mass production; work is less meaningful; the only role that still matters is that of the consumer. And the success with which that role is played depends on the values, judgments, and approval of others. The modern American, Riesman concludes, is therefore "other-directed," with few defenses against the pressures of the group and the larger society. Only a minority—"a saving remnant"—of individuals feels free to act autonomously today.

Nevertheless, according to Harris, "individualism survives as an ideal." Personal sovereignty and privacy are not readily relinquished, even in an age of digits and ciphers and complex public institutions. Every encroachment on private property and the rights of the individual is met with a storm of protest, if not defiance.

But individualism can survive as more than an ideal, according to playwright and novelist William Saroyan. It can also survive as a reality. Although most Americans have in fact become "joiners," there is an alternative: we can resume the simple life-style of an earlier age, discard the automobile, television, and pre-packaged "plastic" foods of our mass production society. In short, Saroyan urges, "Find out if it's worth your time and trouble to be who you are, and if it turns out that it is, then of course you are home free, and an incorruptible individual."

STUDY QUESTIONS

1. Account for the decline of religion and the family as socializing institutions since the colonial period.

Suggested Guidelines

Begin by reviewing Harris' discussion of the central role that religion and the family played in early America. Observe that the churches and the family surrendered socializing functions first to the public schools and then to the modern "mass media." Then consider such factors as individualism, economic opportunity, political democracy, and increasing materialism as contributing elements in the decline of these institutions over time.

Deal first with religion. How did "disestablishment" and the Constitution's guarantee of religious freedom affect the options and strategies of organized churches? Consult Bernard Weisberger for a discussion of the changed conditions and needs reflected by revivalism. Why did sects multiply? Did church leaders' support for social reform movements in the nineteenth century delay religious decline? Observe, however, that although religion lost status it remained a strong influence in the lives of many Americans, as Garry Wills' description of a Catholic boyhood shows. How does he view his church's attempts to adapt to modern conditions? How does Harvey Cox explain the decline of traditional denominations today while sects based on emotionalism and conservative theology on the one hand and Eastern mysticism and communal experiments on the other are attracting adherents? What parallels does he draw to nineteenth-century revivalism? If the developments Cox describes reflect unmet spiritual needs, why does he criticize present day religious objectives?

Turning to the family, consider why the "well-ordered" unit Benjamin Wadsworth described gave way to the more democratic nineteenth-century model Harris mentions. What kinds of changed values and functions does Booth Tarkington's description of turn-of-the-century small town households reflect? What developments in this century further challenged traditional family relationships? Consider here particularly the new economic and social conditions that Betty Friedan's account of the modern women's rights movement reveals. Why are Americans now experimenting with alternative family structures, as Harris observes? Is this development a sign of revitalization of family relationships or further decline?

2. Trace the changing role of public education in American life.

Suggested Guidelines

Observe that although public education became a central socializing

mechanism in American life it was, except in New England, a relatively late development. Note that, as Harris points out, the family and apprenticeship supplied most instructional needs before the nineteenth century. Consult the 1647 Massachusetts School Law as to why New England was an exception to this pattern. If high costs remained the main stumbling block to public education, how did Horace Mann justify the expenditure of public funds for compulsory schooling and teacher training in the 1830s? What economic, social, and political benefits did public education provide? Consider, however, the quality of education offered in the one-room rural school Edward Eggleston describes.

What changes in American society did the reform proposals of John Dewey and other advocates of "progressive education" reflect? How does Lawrence Cremin explain the success of this movement and its later decline? Why in recent decades did the schools become the main arena for achieving racial justice in American society? What does Jonathan Kozol's description of a Boston ghetto school reveal about the problems involved in that mission? According to Harris, what other issues remain controversial in public education today, and what alternatives do critics offer to the traditional public school? Has the decline of religion and the family transferred too much responsibility to the schools? Finally, what educational functions has the "mass media" assumed and how has that development affected the role of public education in American life?

3. Evaluate American "culture" and its future prospects.

Suggested Guidelines

First review the historical controversies Harris describes regarding the quality of American cultural achievements. Then arrive at a working definition of American "culture" in the past and today. You may wish to limit your use of the term to its "high culture" elements. In that case you should evaluate American artistic and intellectual production and consumption according to the standards Randall Jarrell uses. Or you might define culture as the "popular culture" Harris describes, characterized by democratic individual participation, both active and passive. Thirdly, you could consider all creative activities and their consumers as part of the cultural picture in the broader sense.

Whichever approach you take, use Harris' third article, and the Reader selections by Henry James, Randall Jarrell, and Alvin Toffler to determine what factors shaped American cultural attitudes and activities. To what degree and why was American culture distinctive? How does American culture today compare to that of the past? Consider particularly the effect of the commercial values and methods of the modern mass media. Review here as well David Potter's discussion of advertising's impact on American standards and social goals that appears in Unit Two. Finally, do you share Jarrell's pessimism or Toffler's optimism regarding American cultural life?

4. Describe the history of individualism in America and its status today.

Suggested Guidelines

Consider first the influences that shaped American belief in individualism as an ideal—religious concepts, socioeconomic opportunity, political philosophy expressed in governmental structure, educational policy, and the free enterprise system. What were the positive and negative results of this ideal for individuals and for American society in the past? Review here the discussions in Units One and Two of economic individualism and its expression and effects in the world of work and its consequences for the natural environment and for social organization. If freedom of thought and action resulted in unprecedented material and political benefits, were there psychological costs?

Refer to the Reader selection about Mike Fink. What conditions and values does it reflect? Is the nineteenth-century individualism it expresses still viable? Consider here Harris' comparison of earlier Americans' sense of control over their lives to the situation today. What changed conditions does David Riesman's "other-directed" personality reflect? Note that privacy is a corollary of individualism. According to Harris, what is most threatening to privacy today? If big government and big business diminish Americans' sense of personal sovereignty, how has government intervened to equalize opportunity and to protect the individual? Why does individualism as a value and a lifestyle appear to be under attack? What evidence does Harris find that the ideal of individualism is still much alive? How realistic is William Saroyan's prescription for reasserting personal autonomy in a world of conformist pressures? Finally, how do you answer Harris' question as to whether social discipline and individual desire can continue to coexist creatively in America?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Neil Harris

Article 14: The Private Matrix: Family and Church

Ahlstrom, Sydney E. *A Religious History of the American People*. New Haven, Conn., 1972. A massive and masterly scholarly synthesis of American religious life that covers minor cults as well as major denominations.

Bridges, William E. "Family Patterns and Social Values in America, 1825-1875," *American Quarterly* (1965), pp. 3-11. An evaluation of family structure as an agent in the adaptation of children to social and occupational functions.

Calhoun, A. W. *A Social History of the American Family* (3 vols.). New York, 1919, 1946. Now somewhat outdated, particularly in conceptualization, these volumes remain a comprehensive source of data and commentary.

Carter, Paul A. *The Spiritual Crisis of the Gilded Age*. DeKalb, Ill., 1971. Examination of the strains upon traditional notions of sin, virtue, and the afterlife, by scientific theory, racial strife, imperialism, and economic growth.

Demos, John. *A Little Commonwealth*. New York, 1970. A study of family life—child rearing, marital relations, household artifacts—in colonial Plymouth.

Flaherty, David. *Privacy in Colonial New England*. Charlottesville, Va., 1972. A broad survey of how New Englanders defined and protected privacy in their families, churches, homes, and social relations.

Herberg, Will. *Protestant, Catholic, Jew* (rev. ed.). New York, 1955. A classic study of American denominationalism.

Kennedy, David M. *Birth Control in America*. New Haven, Conn., 1970. A biographical study of Margaret Sanger.

Kraditor, Aileen S. *Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1925*. New York, 1965. A study of the strategy that transformed the movement into a middle-class lobby in the effort to attain the vote.

McLoughlin, William G. *Modern Revivalism*. New York, 1959. An analysis of the techniques and beliefs of major revival leaders, including Charles Grandison Finney and Billy Sunday.

Marty, Martin. *Righteous Empire*. New York, 1970. A prize-winning study of Protestantism in America.

Mead, Sidney E. (ed.). *The Lively Experiment*. New York, 1963. A series of important essays on the shape of Protestant denominationalism in American history.

Meyer, Donald. *The Positive Thinkers*. Garden City, N.Y., 1965. A history of mind-cure religious movements in America, from Mary Baker Eddy to Norman Vincent Peale.

Morgan, Edmund S. *The Puritan Family*. Boston, 1944. A pioneering and classic study.

O'Neill, William L. *Divorce in the Progressive Era*. New Haven, Conn., 1967. A study of divorce and attitudes toward it at a moment of significant social change.

Sklar, Kathryn Kish. *Catharine Beecher*. New Haven, Conn., 1973. A biography examining a pioneer publicist for women's education who attempted to create a new and secure place for women in the world of nineteenth-century America.

Welter, Barbara Rush. "The Cult of True Womanhood, 1820-1860," *American Quarterly* (1966), pp. 151-174. An examination of the images appropriate for American females at a time when they were held to exemplify specific moral values.

Wishy, Bernard. *The Child and the Republic*. Philadelphia, 1967. A study, through manuals, fiction, child guidance books, children's literature, and periodicals, of changing attitudes toward child nurture between 1830 and 1900.

Article 15: Socializing Americans: School and Community

Bailyn, Bernard. *Education in the Forming of American Society*. Williamsburg, Va., 1960. A provocative and pioneering attempt to view education in the context of larger social values and institutions and therefore to avoid the institutional narrowness that had previously been most characteristic in America's historiography.

Callahan, Raymond E. *Education and the Cult of Efficiency*. Chicago, 1962. An exposure of the influence of school administrators on the creation of business-like goals and methods in American school systems in the early 1930s.

Cremin, Lawrence A. *American Education: The Colonial Experience, 1607-1783*. New York, 1970. An exhaustive survey of the various forms education took in colonial America, and an effort to establish the relationships between these forms and American social structure, ideology, and political experiences.

Cremin, Lawrence A. *The Transformation of the School.* New York, 1961. A major modern treatment of the impact of progressive education.

Cubberly, Elwood P. *Public Education in the United States.* Boston, 1919. Although its bias and assumptions are now outdated, Cubberly's book contains invaluable information.

Curti, Merle. *The Social Ideas of American Ed.. ators* (rev. ed.). New York, 1959. Originally published in 1935, this study of major American educational theorists—including Horace Mann, Henry Barnard, William James, and John Dewey—is of continuing interest.

Elson, Ruth M. *Guardians of Tradition.* Lincoln, Neb., 1964. An examination of nineteenth-century schoolbooks and the attitudes toward nature, race, politics, and society that they transmitted to millions of students.

Kaestle, Carl F. *The Evolution of an Urban School System.* Cambridge, Mass., 1973. A study of New York's schools from 1750 to 1850, a period that culminated in the creation of its first unified school system.

Katz, Michael B. *Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools.* New York, 1971. Three essays that argue that the failure of the American educational system has historic roots in the methods and objectives of nineteenth-century educational reformers.

Krug, Edward. *The Shaping of the American High School.* New York, 1964. A major source of information on the history of the American high school, its structure and curriculum.

Messerli, Jonathan. *Horace Mann.* New York, 1971. A study of one of the most influential figures in the history of American educational reform, and an effort to place Mann's educational philosophy in the context of contemporary hopes and anxieties.

Morrison, Theodore. *Chautauqua.* Chicago, 1974. A careful history of a major American educational institution and transmitter of culture.

Schultz, Stanley K. *The Culture Factory.* New York, 1973. A study of the Boston public schools from the Revolution to the Civil War in which the author interprets the development of the school system as a part of a larger urban discipline.

Tyack, David. "Bureaucracy and the Common School," *American Quarterly* (1967), pp. 475-498. An examination of late nineteenth-century Portland and problems of structure and organization that were to plague urban school systems.

Veysey, Laurence R. *The Emergence of the American University*. Chicago, 1965. A comprehensive and analytical study of the values and ideals that went into the formation of the modern American university, public and private, in the years between the Civil War and 1910.

Welter, Rush. *Popular Education and Democratic Thought in America*. New York, 1962. A survey of the changing content of educational ideals and their relationship to larger American values from the Revolution to the mid-twentieth century.

Article 16: Popular Culture as a Reflection of American Character

Barnouw, Eric. *A Tower in Babel* (1966), *The Golden Web* (1968), *The Image Empire* (1970). New York. These three volumes cover the history of radio and television broadcasting from their beginnings in the 1920s down to the late 1960s.

Denney, Reuel. *The Astonished Muse*. Chicago, 1964. An original and subtle examination of various forms of popular expression, including essays on hot-rodding, television commercials, and science fiction.

Cawelti, John G. *The Six-Gun Mystique*. Bowling Green, Ind. An analysis of themes of the western in novels, films, and short stories and their connection with American attitudes toward violence and morality.

Dulles, Foster R. *A History of Recreation: America Learns to Play* (2nd ed.). New York, 1965. A survey of American play over three centuries.

Grimsted, David. *Melodrama Unveiled: American Theater and Culture, 1800-1850*. Chicago, 1968. Scholarly survey of the melodramatic form, its actors, plots, playhouses, and audiences.

Harris, Neil. *Humbug: The Art of P. T. Barnum*. Boston, 1973. Biographical interpretation of the most famous and successful of American impresarios, his circus, museums, and hoaxes.

Kouwenhoven, John. *Made in America: The Arts in Modern Civilization*. New York, 1948. An influential study of the development of vernacular traditions in painting, architecture, prose, and industrial design.

Jacobs, Lewis. *The Rise of the American Film*. New York, 1968. Although it ends in the late 1940s, this is still the best narrative history of the American motion picture.

Lynes, Russell. *The Tastemakers*. New York, 1949. Studies in public, private, and corporate taste, concentrating on architecture and the visual arts and their patronage in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

MacDonald, Dwight. *Against the American Grain*. New York, 1965. A series of witty essays on various aspects of contemporary mass culture.

McLean, Albert F., Jr. *American Vaudeville as Ritual*. Lexington, Ky., 1965. Exploiting anthropological models, the author explores the shape of the vaudeville show and its relationship to the "New Folk" of the American city.

Nye, Russel B. *The Unembarrassed Muse*. New York, 1970. A recent survey of the historical forms of American popular culture.

Presbrey, Frank. *The History and Development of Advertising*. Garden City, N.Y., 1929. A profusely illustrated and comprehensive popular history of the art.

Rae, John B. *The Road and the Car in American Life*. Cambridge, Mass., 1971. A study of highways and transportation in the twentieth century that is highly sympathetic to the automobile.

Rosenberg, Bernard, and David Manning White (eds.). *Mass Culture: The Popular Arts in America*. Glencoe, Ill., 1957. A series of seminal essays on the theory and practice of mass culture.

Schickel, Richard. *The Disney Version*. New York, 1968. Often hostile, sometimes unfair, invariably interesting study of Disney as an American businessman, folk hero, and midwestern type.

Article 17: The Rugged Individualists: The Survival of Individualism

Arieli, Yehoshua. *Individualism and Nationalism in American Ideology*. Cambridge, Mass., 1964. A study of the creation of national ideals between 1776 and 1865 as a means of establishing the identity of Americans as a people.

Berthoff, Rowland T. *An Unsettled People*. New York, 1971. An ambitious, comprehensive synthesis that covers the length of American history, periodizing it broadly through social structure, value systems, and the effect of changing experiences.

Bushman, Richard L. *From Puritan to Yankee*. Cambridge, Mass., 1967. Examines Connecticut in the years between 1690 and 1765 and the emergence of new personalities, forged in the economic and religious strains of daily life.

Cawelti, John G. *Apostles of the Self-Made Man*. Chicago, 1965. Traces the idea of success in America, both in fiction and advice literature, from the age of Jefferson to the mid-twentieth century.

Greene, Theodore, P. *America's Heroes*. New York, 1970. Taking four periods—1787 to 1820, 1894 to 1903, 1904 to 1913, and 1914 to 1918—Greene examines the biographies in American popular magazines to discover the shifting fashions in heroism.

Hofstadter, Richard. *Social Darwinism in American Thought*. Philadelphia, 1944. A famous study examining the influence of the theories of Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, William Graham Sumner, and others who worked with theories of evolution and natural selection.

Lynn, Kenneth S. *The Dream of Success*. Boston, 1955. Lynn analyzes a number of late nineteenth-century novelists, including Frank Norris, Theodore Dreiser, and Robert Herrick, to indicate the strains and tensions projected by the era's emphasis on economic ambition and personal expression.

McWilliams, Wilson Carey. *The Idea of Fraternity in America*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1973. A study that moves from the seventeenth to the twentieth century, this book explores the meaning of social philosophy in America, paying particular attention to efforts at reconciling liberal theories of individual achievement and religious dreams of a community held together by ties of affection and brotherhood.

Potter, David M. *People of Plenty*. Chicago, 1954. An argument about the relationship between the American character and the presence of economic abundance that exploits insights developed by anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists.

Riesman, David. *The Lonely Crowd*. New Haven, Conn., 1950. A highly popular analysis of personality change in America, with a lament for the decline of the "inner-directed" American and an assessment of the state and fate of American individualism.

Somkin, Fred. *Unquiet Eagle*. Ithaca, N.Y., 1967. A study of American values and moods in the first half of the nineteenth century, with particular attention paid to nostalgia, time, space, and prosperity as problems in the creation of democratic community.

Stein, Maurice R. *The Eclipse of Community*. Princeton, N.J., 1960. A review of a number of famous twentieth-century community studies—including works by Robert Park, Robert and Helen Lynd, and Lloyd Warner—and thus an examination of the relationships among urbanization, bureaucratization, and industrialization that have affected the value and capacities of individualism.

Wecter, Dixon. *The Hero in America*. New York, 1941. A narrative of changing styles in American hero worship from Captain John Smith and the Pilgrim Fathers down to Ford, Lindbergh, and FDR.

Wilson, R. Jackson. *In Quest of Community*. New York, 1968. A study of American social philosophy, in particular of five men, Charles S. Peirce, James M. Baldwin, E. A. Ross, G. Stanley Hall, and Josiah Royce, and their efforts at formulating philosophies that moved beyond individualism, to better adapt to the needs of a new industrial society.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

NEIL HARRIS is currently a professor of history at the University of Chicago and director of its new National Humanities Institute. He previously taught at Harvard and was a visiting professor at Yale University. A specialist in social and cultural history, he is also a consultant to the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Children's Television Network. He is the author of *The Artist in American Society: The Formative Years 1790-1860* and *Humbug: The Art of P. T. Barnum* and editor of *The History of the United States, Source Readings* and *The Land of Contrasts, 1880-1901.*

HELEN S. HAWKINS is a post-graduate research historian in the Program of Science, Technology and Public Affairs at the University of California, San Diego, from which she received her doctorate. She has been an instructor at San Diego Mesa College.

ROBERT L. HEILBRONER is the Norman Thomas Professor of Economics at the New School for Social Research, where he has been a member of the faculty since 1963. His study of *The Worldly Philosophers*, now in its fourth edition, has been translated into more than twenty languages. Among his many other books are *The Great Ascent, The Making of Economic Society, The Limits of American Capitalism*, and, most recently, *An Inquiry into the Human Prospect*. He is a frequent contributor to journals, including *The New York Review* and *The New York Times Magazine.*

WALTER LaFEBER is the Marie Underhill Noll Professor of American History at Cornell University, where he has been a member of the faculty since 1959. A specialist in diplomatic history, he won an award for his undergraduate teaching in 1966, and he served as Chairman of the Department of History from 1968 to 1969. He was awarded the Beveridge Prize of the American Historical Association in 1962 for *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion*, which traces American empire

building from 1860 to 1898. His other books include *America, Russia and the Cold War* and *The Creation of the American Empire,* which he coauthored. He has also edited *John Quincy Adams and the American Continental Empire* and *America in the Cold War.*

MICHAEL E. PARRISH is an associate professor of history at the University of California, San Diego. Author of *Securities Regulation and the New Deal,* he is currently writing a biography of Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter. From 1974 to 1975 he was a Liberal Arts Fellow at the Harvard Law School. He served as assistant coordinator for this Course by Newspaper and coedited *American Issues Forum: A Courses by Newspaper Reader* (2 vols.).

PAUL A. SAMUELSON is a Nobel Prize-winning economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Currently the Institute Professor, he joined the faculty at MIT in 1940. He is a contributing editor and columnist for *Newsweek,* and he has served as a consultant to numerous government agencies, including the U.S. Treasury, the Council of Economic Advisors, and the Federal Reserve Board. His basic text, *Economics,* has been translated into twenty foreign languages and has sold more than 3 million copies. He is also the author of *Foundations of Economic Analysis* and coauthor of *Linear Programming and Economic Analysis.* His *Collected Scientific Papers* have been brought out in a three-volume edition.

JANE L. SCHEIBER is editorial director of the Courses by Newspaper Project and a member of the academic staff of University Extension, University of California, San Diego. She was previously research associate in the Public Affairs Center at Dartmouth College. She is a contributing author to *Black Labor in America,* editor of *America and the Future of Man,* and coeditor of *In Search of the American Dream* and *American Issues Forum: A Courses by Newspaper Reader* (2 vols.).